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Data for the U.S. and the Euro-area during the post-Bretton Woods period shows that 
nominal and real exchange rates are more volatile than consumption, very persistent, and 
highly correlated with each other. Standard models with nominal rigidities match reasonably 
well the volatility and persistence of the nominal exchange rate, but require an average 
contract duration above 4 quarters to approximate the real exchange rate counterparts. I 
propose a two-country model with financial intermediaries and argue that: First, sticky and 
asymmetric information introduces a lag in the consumption response to currently 
unobservable shocks, mostly foreign. Accordingly, the real exchange rate becomes more 
volatile to induce enough expenditure-switching across countries for all markets to clear. 
Second, differences in the degree of price stickiness across markets and firms weaken the 
correlation between the nominal exchange rate and the relative CPI price. This correlation is 
important to match the moments of the real exchange rate. The model suggests that 
asymmetric information and differences in price stickiness account better for the stylized 
facts without relying on an average contract duration for the U.S. larger than the current 
empirical estimates. 
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The current empirical evidence indicates that the bilateral nominal and real exchange rates have been
excessively volatile and highly persistent during the post-Bretton Woods period. Nominal and real exchange
rates have also been highly correlated. I use data for the U.S. Dollar and a synthetic aggregate of the
Euro-zone to quantify these moments. However, similar patterns have been consistently uncovered between
the U.S. and other major OECD countries (e.g., Chari et al., 2002, Selaive and Tuesta, 2003). These facts
take their own place among the notable puzzles in international macroeconomics under the tag of the excess
volatility-high persistence anomaly.
I develop a two-country, general equilibrium bond economy with traded goods in the spirit of Chari et al.
(2002). I investigate the role of frictions in the goods market in the form of sticky prices in local currency
(e.g., G. Benigno, 2004) and the role of asset market incompleteness with intermediation (e.g., P. Benigno,
2001). I show that this class of models is capable of replicating the volatility relative to consumption and
the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of the real exchange rate. Matching these two moments requires an average
contract duration of 4 − 5 quarters (alternatively, a Calvo parameter of 0.75 − 0.8)1. Still, this range is
signiﬁcatively above the estimates in the literature for the U.S. and lies at the upper bound for Europe (see,
e.g., Galí et al., 2001).
The model predictions are broadly consistent with the existing literature on the real exchange rate, but
they are accompanied by counterfactual results along other dimensions. Notably, too much volatility on
the nominal exchange rate, the CPI prices, and terms of trade. As with most models in the open economy
macroeconomics literature, it presumes that all economic agents agree on their expectations about the future
state of the economy (i.e., forecasts are homogeneous). In this paper I conjecture that such an assumption
has non-negligible consequences for the determination of the nominal and real exchange rates.
I consider an environment where each agent makes his forecast based on private information about the
current state and all public information. Private information diﬀers across agents (is asymmetric). Public
information summarizes the state of the world economy, but gets revealed with a short delay. Agents must
resolve a non-trivial signal extraction problem and decide their optimal commitment choices simultaneously.
Heterogeneity across types of agents based on information content, then, gives rise to forecasting disagree-
ments (i.e., heterogeneous forecasts). In this way, asymmetric information diﬀusion opens up a new channel
for the transmission of shocks in the economy.
My work suggests that asymmetrically-dispersed information explains better the volatility of the real
and nominal exchange rates relative to consumption. In other words, it shows that it is possible to place
the volatilities in the ballpark for the data with an average contract duration of 3 − 3.5 quarters which
seems much closer to the empirical estimates. I also ﬁnd that the correlation between the real and nominal
exchange rates is high, although not as much as in the data.
When information becomes scarce, the ability of any agent to adjust its response to current shocks is
also more limited. If information is asymmetrically-dispersed, private information acquires a new role as a
signal in place of other private information not currently available to the agent. This contributes to create
a lagged response to unobservable shocks (which become public information with a delay) and to higher
reliance on a subset of observable shocks. In this context, the model generates less volatile consumption,
1I ﬁnd support for G. Benigno’s (2004) claim that diﬀerences in price stickiness across the markets in which a ﬁrm operates
can be a conduit for higher real exchange rate persistence.
1while the expenditure-switching eﬀects become less sensitive to relative prices.
Expenditure-switching is important in general equilibrium in order for markets to clear properly whenever
the economy is hit with diﬀerent country-speciﬁcs h o c k s . T h e r e f o r e ,t h er e a le x c h a n g er a t e( a n dt e r m so f
trade also) become more volatile to ensure a large enough expenditure-switch to accommodate the current
shocks. In crude terms, this is the main channel through which asymmetric information operates on the
volatility of the real exchange rate in the model.
I also document empirically a tight relationship between the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of the real ex-
change rate and the degree of price stickiness. The diﬀerence between the observed persistence of the real
exchange rate and the estimated degree of price stickiness cannot be explained away neither by asymmetric
information, nor by habit formation or with risk-averse ﬁnancial intermediaries. Instead, I show that the
price-setting framework introduced by G. Benigno (2004), which allows for diﬀerences in price stickiness
across markets, oﬀers an alternative to increase the persistence of the real exchange rate without requiring
a larger contract average duration.
I argue that models in which each variety is produced in one location and ﬁrm’s face the same contract
duration in all markets (for local consumption or for exports) result in a strong link between the nominal
exchange rate and the relative CPI prices. This is the case because: (a) the price-setting rule depends on
the same weighting scheme of current and future marginal costs, and (b) marginal costs are identical but
selling prices in each market are expressed in the local currency. Hence, pricing diﬀerences across markets
are reduced to a particular function of the current and future nominal exchange rate.
G. Benigno’s (2004) framework changes the weighting scheme across markets and as a result introduces
a wedge between the price in each market that is functionally related to the local marginal cost. The
persistence coming from marginal costs and the lower correlation between the nominal exchange rate and
relative prices feed back into the real exchange rate pushing up its ﬁrst-order autocorrelation. In this context,
asymmetric information has also a small contribution to play. Equilibrium in the labor and output markets
ties marginal costs to consumption. Therefore, disagreements in the forecast of consumption as well as the
nominal exchange rate become a more relevant friction now.
In summary, in the paper I discuss how asymmetric information and nominal rigidities aﬀect the volatility
and persistence of the exchange rates. I explain the constraints that most directly inﬂuence the outcomes of
the model. I observe that asymmetric information and price rigidities can improve the ﬁt of the model and
give an interpretation for the excess volatility-high persistence anomaly. I also discuss other key statistics.
For instance, I argue that these two frictions partially account for the systematic and pervasive violations of
perfect international risk-sharing (the real exchange rate-relative consumption anomaly). I also explore the
complementary role of other features of the model like intermediation through risk-averse ﬁrms and habit
formation on the consumer side.
The present model indicates that asymmetric information and nominal rigidities are central to under-
standing the excess volatility-high persistence anomaly, and that the properties of the data are easier to
reconcile with the theoretical predictions of the open macro literature if this two frictions are combined
together.
22 Literature Review
Chari et al. (2002) develop a general equilibrium monetary model with sticky prices, capital accumulation and
ﬁnancial incompleteness to account for the observed volatility and persistence of real exchange rates. They
show that if risk aversion is high, preferences are separable in leisure and prices are ﬁxed for 4 quarters, then
their model can explain the volatility of real exchange rates but is less persistent than the data. Bergin and
Feenstra (2001) argue that translog preferences amplify the persistence of shocks, but they still need to impose
an implausibly large contract length of 8 − 12 quarters in order to match the empirical autocorrelations.
Kollmann (2001) considers a semi-small open-economy model with Calvo (1983) price- and wage-setting,
and no capital. If both prices and wages are ﬁxed over an average of 4 quarters and monetary shocks are
the dominant force, his model generates variability in the real and nominal exchange rates that is consistent
with the data (and similar to the results of Chari et al., 2002). G. Benigno (2004) uses a two-country general
equilibrium model with nominal price stickiness and local-currency pricing to show that a wide range of
Taylor-type policy rules can generate real exchange rate autocorrelations around the ones observed in the
data. Therefore, the consensus appears to be that the volatility and persistence of the real exchange rate
are directly linked to frictions in the goods market.
Motivated by the empirical failure of the law of one price, the reasonable success of staggered prices to
explain the real exchange rate, and in particular by widespread local-currency pricing behavior (e.g., Knetter,
1993, Gopinath and Rigobon, 2006), I assume that nominal prices are sticky à la Calvo (1983) and ﬁrms are
price-discriminating monopolists. Moreover, ﬁrms set prices in the local currency and confront a diﬀerent
average contract length in the domestic and foreign markets (e.g., G. Benigno, 2004).
With complete markets, the real exchange rate is equal to the ratio of marginal utilities of consumption
in each country (up to a constant). Hence, real exchange rates and relative consumption are tightly linked.
Chari et al. (2002) replace the assumption of complete international asset markets with a nominal bond
economy to break the connection, but they still ﬁnd a high positive cross-correlation between the real
exchange rate and relative consumption unlike that observed in the data2. P. Benigno (2001) proposes,
instead, an alternative characterization of the bond economy with ad hoc costs of international borrowing
(recently applied by Selaive and Tuesta, 2003, and G. Benigno and Thoenissen, 2006, among others).
G. Benigno and Thoenissen (2006) explain that costs of borrowing coupled with non-traded goods would
explain the negative correlations found in the data. Similarly, Selaive and Tuesta (2003) argue that costs of
borrowing and distribution costs for traded goods generate violations of the law of one price (intermediate
degrees of pass-through), deviations from uncovered interest rate parity and sensible cross-correlations.
Hence, current research seems to favor incomplete markets and borrowing costs as necessary devices to ﬁt
the key cross-correlations in the data. The exact role of non-traded goods or non-traded distribution services
is, however, still being debated.
My model assumes that all goods are traded based on the empirical evidence that ﬂuctuations of the real
exchange rate arise mostly from deviations of the law of one price on traded goods (e.g., Engel, 1999, and
Chari et al., 2002). Gagnon’s (1996) ﬁndings point out a signiﬁcant and robust long-run link between the real
exchange rate and the net foreign asset position. This evidence and its potential impact on the structure
2I refer to this puzzle as the real exchange rate-relative consumption anomaly. Backus and Smith (1993) originally reported
this as evidence of lack of international risk-sharing (in a model with non-traded goods). Kollmann (1995), Ravn (2001) and
Head et al. (2004) have also found little connection between the real exchange rate and relative consumption.
3of cross-correlations motivates me to also introduce ﬁnancially-constrained households and international
borrowing costs. However, I do not merely impose an ad hoc cost as suggested by P. Benigno (2001). I
build up a simple problem of portfolio choice with fully rational ﬁnancial intermediaries3. I model these
intermediaries in the spirit of Evans and Lyons (2007), but I view their role simply as that of myopic traders
(or currency speculators).
Several recent papers, including Mankiw and Reis (2002, 2006) argue that sticky information resolves
some stylized business cycle models (for instance, on the dynamics of inﬂation). In this paper I conjecture
that, indeed, such informational frictions have non-negligible consequences for the determination of the
nominal and real exchange rates. I also learn from Evans and Lyons (2007) that fundamental information is
not symmetrically observed by all agents. Naturally, this fact can alter the exchange rate dynamics "even
controlling for information availability and assuming rational pricing, by changing the way (asset) prices
respond to information" (Carlson and Osler, 2000).
Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2004a, 2004b, 2006) rely on two distinct types of noise (noisy signals about
fundamentals and ad hoc non-fundamental noise) to model information dissemination, to induce rational
confusion about the source of exchange rate ﬂuctuations and to explain heterogeneous forecasting along the
equilibrium path4. Naturally, they claim that the information structure is essential to explain the nominal
exchange rate dynamics (particularly, the excess volatility) and other features of the data.
Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006) also argue that fundamentals play a small role in the short- and
medium-run, but are dominant in the long-run as more information becomes available, and that exchange
rates are a weak predictor of future fundamentals. With these results in mind, I am led to consider the role
of information diﬀusion in my general equilibrium model too. The logic being that heterogenous forecasts
add an additional channel for the transmission of shocks. Therefore, they alter the second-order moments
of the endogenous variables and help replicate the dynamics of the (nominal and real) exchange rates.
However, unlike Kaplan (2005) and Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006), I do not require non-fundamental
noise to induce rational confusion. Instead, in my setup information is asymmetrically-dispersed across
agents, and no one is suﬃciently well-informed to infer which shocks drive the ﬂuctuations of each endogenous
variable at a given point in time. I adapt my model to investigate the role that heterogeneous information
plays in the dynamics of the economy (especially the exchange rates) and the correlations of per capita
consumption, CPI prices, exchange rates and terms of trade.
2.1 Stylized Facts of the Exchange Rate
Here, I document the properties of the bilateral exchange rate between the United States (home country)
and the 12 member country Euro-zone (foreign country). My measure of the nominal exchange rate, St,i s
U.S. Dollars (USD) per Euro (EUR). Prior to 2001, the synthetic nominal exchange rate is computed as a
GDP-weighted function of the USD per National Currency rates. The U.S. real exchange rate relative to




Pt ,w h e r ePt and P∗
t are the CPI prices in the United States and the
Euro-zone, respectively. I proxy the U.S. terms of trade, TOTt, as the world import-to-export price ratio in
3These ﬁnancial intermediaries allow me to separate the consumption-savings decision of households from the portfolio choice.
Most importantly, it permits both decisions to be made under diﬀerent information sets. Up to a ﬁrst-order approximation,
the equilibrium conditions are identical to those of P. Benigno (2001) except for the diﬀerent information structure.
4For more technical details of the partially revealing equilibrium, see also the research of Kasa (2000) and Kasa et al. (2005).
4USD. Hence, a decrease in the nominal exchange rate means that the USD has appreciated in value relative
to the EUR, and U.S. terms of trade improve only if the import-to-export price ratio decreases.
All quarterly series are obtained from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System/Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(FRB/FRBNY), and span the post-Bretton Woods period from 1973:I until 2006:III5.
Volatility and Persistence. In Tables 1 and 2 I present some statistics on exchanges rates, U.S. terms of
trade, CPI prices and per capita consumption for the U.S. and the Euro-zone. The data is expressed in logs,
multiplied by 100 and Hodrick-Prescott (H-P) ﬁltered6. I note from Table 1 that the standard deviation of
the real and nominal exchange rates is more than 6 times larger than the volatility of the U.S. per capita
consumption. In turn, the volatility of U.S. terms of trade and CPI prices is no larger than 2.5 times the
volatility of U.S. per capita consumption.
I observe in Table 1 that the real and nominal exchange rates and the U.S. terms of trade are also
highly persistent, with autocorrelations of 0.848, 0.859 and 0.817 respectively. Furthermore, the per capita
consumption and CPI price series are also very persistent with autocorrelations ranging from 0.800 to 0.933.
These numbers are similar to the ones found by Bergin and Feenstra (2001) and Chari et al. (2002) for
several European countries. The inability of conventional models to match these standard deviations and
autocorrelations constitutes the origin of the excess volatility-high persistence anomaly.M yt h e o r yf o c u s e s
speciﬁcally on rationalizing this anomaly in the presence of asymmetric diﬀusion of information and nominal
rigidities.
Cross-correlations. From Table 2 I observe that an appreciation of the U.S. bilateral exchange rate or
an improvement in the U.S. terms of trade is positively correlated with the U.S. per capita consumption and
negatively correlated with the Euro-zone per capita consumption. The cross-correlation between U.S. and
Euro-zone per capita consumption is just 0.426, although this is still larger than the value of 0.16 between
the U.S. and a weighted aggregate of European countries reported by Selaive and Tuesta (2003). The failure
of risk-sharing, however, transpires blatantly in the negative correlation between the exchange rates and the
relative per capita consumption between the U.S. and the Euro-zone, with cross-correlations of −0.233 and
−0.338 respectively7. T h i si sk n o w na st h ereal exchange rate-relative consumption anomaly.M y m o d e l
explores the potential contribution of asymmetrically-dispersed information to explain this feature of the
data.
Furthermore, I also investigate the impact (if any) that the theory has along other dimensions. First,
5Chari et al. (2002) explore the bilateral relationships between the U.S. and eleven other major European countries (Austria,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and Switzerland). In my dataset I ﬁnd evidence
of similar patterns between the U.S. and the U.K. as well as between the U.S. and the Euro-zone.
6Many macroeconomic time series, notably the nominal exchange rate, are suspected of being non-stationary with near-unit
roots. In any event, King and Rebelo (1993) show that the H-P ﬁlter is capable of rendering stationary any integrated process
up to fourth order.
7The cross-correlation of the (real) exchange rate with relative consumption is often found to be negative in the literature.
Chari et al. (2002) show that the median bilateral cross-correlation between the U.S. and the four largest economies in Europe
is −0.07.C o r s e t t i et al. (2004) argue that the median estimate for a selection of OECD countries is −0.3.G . B e n i g n o a n d
Thoenissen (2006) compute a median cross-correlation of −0.288 for 14 industrialized nations relative to the U.S., and Selaive
and Tuesta (2003) report −0.17 for the U.S. and an aggregate of European countries.
5the U.S. CPI price is negatively correlated (but small in absolute value) with the USD per EUR nominal
exchange rate. The sign is reversed for the USD per U.K. Pound (UKP) rate. In either case, it suggests
incomplete pass-through of the nominal exchange rate. Second, the nominal and real exchange rates are
highly correlated with each other at 0.987. Third, the nominal exchange rate correlation with the relative
consumption prices between the Euro-zone and the U.S. is only −0.314 while it is expected to be −1 under
power-purchasing parity (PPP). This shows in a simple way that PPP violations matter. Finally, the nominal
and real exchange rates are both positively correlated with the U.S. terms of trade around 0.275 − 0.367.
Failure to capture this feature tends to be identiﬁed as a terms of trade anomaly, which is exacerbated in
models of local-currency pricing (e.g., Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ, 2000a).
3 Basic Structure of the Monetary Model
I specify a stochastic, two-country general equilibrium model populated by a continuum of inﬁnitely lived
households. There is also a continuum of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms located in each country, which
produce a diﬀerentiated, tradable good. Households and ﬁrms in the home country lie on the interval [0,n],
while foreign households and ﬁrms are placed on the interval (n,1].T h e p o p u l a t i o n s i z en is equal to the
range of produced goods. The description is completed with a continuum of ﬁnancial intermediaries, located
in the home country, and indexed on the interval [0,n].
Frictions in the goods market are modelled through nominal price stickiness with exogenous partial
adjustment rates à la Calvo (1983). Deviations of the real exchange rate from power-purchasing parity
(henceforth, PPP) arise because prices are sticky in the local currency and ﬁrms can eﬀectively discriminate
across markets (e.g., G. Benigno, 2004). Frictions in the assets market are due to incompleteness and
intermediation in a way that merges some key insights on foreign exchange microstructure within a fully-
ﬂedged macroeconomic model. I postulate a bond economy (e.g., P. Benigno, 2001, Chari et al., 2002,
Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ, 2002, and Thoenissen, 2003) where portfolio management is delegated to (myopic
and risk-averse) ﬁnancial intermediaries8. This assets market structure provides limited possibilities to
pool consumption risks between the two countries, and depends on ﬁnancial intermediaries to hedge risks
internationally.
I model each economic agent as atomistic and informationally-constrained to account for diﬀerences in
the information set available to households, ﬁrms and ﬁnancial intermediaries. This feature distinguishes
my work from other general equilibrium models, and serves me to explore how asymmetrically-dispersed
information becomes embedded (and revealed) through the actions of each agent. Here, the timing of
actions and information arrival becomes crucial. I assume that the stochastic dynamics of the exogenous
shocks are common knowledge. Nonetheless, at time t each agent only observes the realization of a subset
of current shocks and the public record of the exogenous and endogenous variables up to time t − 1.
Based on his own private information set and all publicly-available data, each agent chooses an optimal
schedule at time t to solve his optimization problem. Once the policy rule on the control variables is
decided, he is fully committed (or pre-committed) to follow through with it. Then all markets open up, and
8This framework replaces ad hoc costs of international borrowing (see, e.g., P. Benigno, 2001, Selaive and Tuesta, 2003, and
G. Benigno and Thoenissen, 2006) with a simple model of ﬁnancial intermediation in the spirit of Carlson and Osler (2000)
and Evans and Lyons (2007).
6the equilibrium prices ensure that demand and supply schedules equate. Simultaneously, the government
collects all the information on the time t endogenous variables and the exogenous shocks to be reported from
time t +1onwards.
3.1 The Intertemporal Consumption and Savings Problem
The lifetime utility for household j in the home country is additively separable in aggregate consumption,
Cj,t,r e a lm o n e yb a l a n c e s ,
Md
j,t
Pt , and labor supply, Ls




































































where ξt is a country-speciﬁc shock to preferences in logs, and β ∈ (0,1) is the subjective discount factor.
Alternatively, β and ξt can be interpreted as the time-trend and random components of a stochastic discount
factor. The conditional expectations operator E[·|H t] reﬂects the (public and private) information available
at time t to all domestic households. The coeﬃcients of relative risk aversion satisfy γ>0( γ 6=1 )and ϕ>0,
while the coeﬃcients χ and κ are nonnegative.
The money-in-the-utility-function approach is based on the idea that the liquidity service of money
increases the ‘utility’ of households by reducing their transaction costs. N (·) is an increasing and concave
function of the real balances,
Md
j,t
Pt . The catching-up-with-the-Joneses external habit is proportional to one-
period lagged per capita consumption. The parameter b measures the degree of habit persistence9.
Households have well-deﬁned preferences over foreign and home varieties of goods. The home and foreign
consumption bundles of the domestic household, CH
j,t and CF
















































Thus, the elasticity of substitution across varieties produced within a country is θ>1, the elasticity of
intratemporal substitution between the home and foreign bundles of varieties is σ>0,a n dn ∈ (0,1)
represents the relative weight on domestically-produced goods (and the population size).
9Habit formation alters the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion on consumption. A more detailed discussion on the role of
habits (and other alternative speciﬁcations) can be found in Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and Fuhrer (2000).
7The foreign household has identical preferences, with the exception of the preference shock ξ
∗
t. Foreign
households consume their own basket of goods among all varieties, C∗





and supply their own labor market, Ls∗
j,t. On top of that, the (private and public) information available to
foreign households is collected in the information set H∗
t. The asterisk speciﬁcally denotes foreign variables
(or foreign parameters).
The Consumer Price Indexes, Exchange Rates and Relative Prices. The domestic CPI index,
Pt,i sd e ﬁned as the minimum expenditure needed to buy one unit of the consumption index Cj,t. Under









































t are the price sub-indexes for the home- and foreign-produced bundle of goods in units of
the home currency. Home and foreign households have identical tastes and, therefore, the respective price
indexes are symmetric abroad.



































The relative price Tt represents the value of imported goods (quoted in the domestic market) relative to the
value of the domestic good supplied locally. This ratio is the ‘local market’ cost of replacing one unit of
imports with one unit of the domestically-produced good. Instead, terms of trade ToTt represents the value
of imported goods (quoted in the domestic market) relative to the value of the domestic good exported to
the foreign market. but expressed in units of the local currency. This ratio measures the ‘foreign market’
cost of replacing one unit of imports with one unit of exports. Similarly for T∗
t and ToT∗
t .
The Budget Constraint. Household j in the home country allocates his ﬁnancial wealth between do-
mestic currency, Md
j,t, and a nominal risk-free domestic bond, Bj,t. One-period bonds are in zero net-supply,
but involve the promise to pay one unit of the local currency at maturity. Each household maximizes its
10Terms of trade and relative prices are identical and the real exchange rate is equal to one only if the law of one price
(LOOP) holds in both countries. Since the LOOP condition fails in the model, ﬂuctuations of the real exchange rate arise and
the distinction between terms of trade and relative prices matters.




j,t ≤ Bj,t−1 + Md
j,t−1 + WtLs
j,t + Πj,t + TRj,t − PtCj,t, (9)
where Wt is the competitive nominal wage, it is the log nominal interest rate, TRj,t is a nominal transfer
received from the government, and Πj,t are nominal proﬁts. I assume that each domestic household holds















are distributed equally among domestic households11. Ct (h) and C∗
t (h) denote the per capita output
consumption of variety h in the domestic and foreign market, and Pt (h) and P∗
t (h) are the corresponding
prices. Ld
t (h) denotes the domestic labor demand of ﬁrm h.
Similarly, household j in the foreign country allocates his wealth on foreign currency, Md∗
j,t,a n dar i s k - f r e e
nominal bond denominated in the foreign currency, B∗
j,t. I also assume that foreign households receive an
aliquot share of proﬁts of all foreign ﬁrms, Π∗
j,t, and that trade in foreign ﬁrms’ shares is not allowed. In
other words, the model imposes upon the households a strict home bias in asset-holdings.
The Initial Conditions. I assume that the initial conditions are identical across all households within
a country, although diﬀerences may still arise between the two countries. Households earn a competitive
wage, which is equalized in their local labor market, and share equally on the proﬁts of the local producers
(for whom they work). Households receive the same type of information. The combination of all these
assumptions implies that the maximization problem is identical for all households located in a given country,
and therefore they must choose the same optimal consumption, labor supply and money demand paths.
Hence, I can drop the index j and simply consider a representative household in each country.
3.2 The Price-Setting Problem under Sticky Prices
Each ﬁrm supplies the home and foreign market, sets prices in the local currency (henceforth, LCP pricing)
and, consequently, invoices exports in the currency of the importer. Frictions in the goods market are
modelled with nominal price stickiness à la Calvo (1983). Furthermore, ﬁrms engage in third-degree price
discrimination across markets and enjoy monopolistic power in their own variety. These assumptions require
a degree of international market segmentation which prevents the equalization of prices across borders, and
opens up an important channel for deviations of the reale x c h a n g er a t ef r o mP P P( e . g . ,B e t t sa n dD e v e r e u x ,
1996, 2000, Thoenissen, 2003, and G. Benigno, 2004).
Here, I focus on ﬂuctuations in real exchange rates arising solely from deviations of the law of one price
(henceforth, LOOP) on traded goods. I abstract from non-traded goods altogether to be consistent with the
evidence documented by Engel (1999) and Chari et al. (2002). I also do without the iceberg-type trading
costs proposed by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000b), and the home-product bias preferences favored by Warnock
11Domestic households also own the stock of ﬁnancial intermediaries. However, by construction ﬁnancial intermediaries
generate no dividend for their shareholders.
9(2003). Since consumption baskets between the U.S. and Europe are quite similar and vary little over time,
I cannot entirely rely on composition eﬀects to account for all the real exchange rate ﬂuctuations.
The Technology and the Net Discounted Proﬁts. With probability αH,α H∗ ∈ [0,1],a tt i m et the







abroad, the ﬁrm receives a signal to opti-
mally reset each price. Firm h ∈ [0,n] produces a diﬀerentiated (and tradable) variety with a linear-in-labor
technology, i.e.
Y s
t (h)=e x p( at)Ld
t (h), (11)
where at is a country-speciﬁc productivity shock (or TFP shock) in logs. The labor market is perfectly
competitive, the labor force is homogeneous and immobile across borders, and wages equalize in each country.
Households are charged a diﬀerent price for the same variety in each country, but they still face a constant
price within a country for all units of output purchased. Re-selling across borders is banned. A domestic ﬁrm
h has to choose the price charged domestically, e Pt (h), and the price charged abroad (in units of the foreign
currency), e P∗
t (h). The objective is to maximize the expected discounted value of its net proﬁts subject to
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is the corresponding intertemporal marginal rate of substitution for the domestic representative household.
The conditional expectations operator E[·|F t] reﬂects the (private and public) information available to all
domestic ﬁrms at time t. e Y d
t,t+τ (h) and e Y d∗
t,t+τ (h) indicate the demand for any variety h respectively at home
and abroad, given that prices e Pt (h) and e P∗
t (h) remain unchanged between time t and t + τ.T h u s , e a c h
ﬁrm faces a downward-sloping demand curve for its output.
The problem for foreign ﬁrm f is analogous. The degree of nominal price stickiness of the foreign ﬁrm’s
contract is determined by αF and αF∗, while the discount factor for proﬁts is the intertemporal marginal
rate of substitution of the foreign representative household. Wages and TFP shocks, W∗
t and a∗
t respectively,
are country-speciﬁc. The information set available to foreign ﬁr m si sd e n o t e dF∗
t .
The Initial Conditions. I assume that initial conditions are identical for ﬁrms within a country, but may
diﬀer across countries. Firms pay a competitive wage, and distribute proﬁts among the local households. In
addition, ﬁrms within a country share the same information. These assumptions imply that the maximization
problem is symmetric for all ﬁrms in a given country. Therefore, they should choose the same optimal price-
12Under the Calvo speciﬁcation, the probability of setting a new price, 1 − αi,i st h es a m ef o ra l lﬁrms of type i and is
independent of the time elapsed since the last price change. Hence, the average time under ﬁxed prices is equal to 1
1−αi .
Wolman (1999) discusses a variant of the model where probabilities are state-dependent. Golosov and Lucas (2007) derive
similar predictions with a menu-cost model.
10setting rule. Hence, I can drop the indexes h and f among the ﬁrms that re-optimize their prices at a given
period.
3.3 The Portfolio Choice Problem with Myopic Intermediaries
The portfolio choice is entirely delegated to rational ﬁnancial intermediaries (e.g., Evans and Lyons, 2007).
Moreover, portfolio allocations become insulated from the consumption-savings decision of households. In-
termediaries are all located in the home country, an assumption loosely based on the patterns of geographical
specialization that can be observed in the current ﬁnancial markets. Financial intermediation can be con-
ducted by a broad class of agents which includes interbank traders, foreign-exchange dealers, mutual fund
managers, or managers of international bond and portfolio funds. However, I model my ﬁnancial inter-
mediaries simply as currency speculators who exploit nominal exchange rate ﬂuctuations and arbitrage
opportunities in the asset markets for proﬁt.
The pre-eminent characteristics of these speculators are: (i) they invest internationally and thereby incur
an exchange rate risk, (ii) they get compensated on the basis of net proﬁts, and (iii) they are impatient in the
short-run and tend to implement (quasi-) myopic portfolio strategies. These currency speculators provide
a convenient (and natural) alternative to the ad hoc notion of borrowing costs introduced by P. Benigno
(2001).
The Expected Proﬁts. Myopic intermediaries are ﬁrms that maximize next-period expected proﬁts minus















z,t denotes the nominal asset position taken in the foreign bonds market, and E[·|I t] is the expec-
tations operator conditional on the (private and public) information available at time t. I denote πI
z,t+1 the
nominal proﬁts of intermediation for z. Nominal proﬁts are naturally deﬁned as,
πI
z,t+1 ≡ Xz,t+1 − exp(it)Xz,t, (15)
and are calculated as the nominal wealth at time t+1, Xz,t+1, minus the opportunity cost of simply holding
the time t wealth domestically for one period.
The management of a portfolio with a non-negligible foreign asset position reduces the ‘utility’ of currency
speculators because it increases the risk in their transactions. I model this disutility eﬀect as a quadratic
function of the foreign asset position (expressed in units of the domestic currency), to penalize the exposure
of the ﬁrm to exchange rate (and other foreign) risks. The coeﬃcient of the quadratic disutility term is
λ ≥ 0.
11The Budget Constraint. Id e ﬁne the per-period budget constraints of a ﬁnancial intermediary z between















z,t denote the nominal position taken by a given intermediary in the domestic and foreign
bond markets, respectively. As a result, the intertemporal budget constraint faced by currency speculator z
can be summarized as,









Unlimited short-selling is allowed every period with full use of the proceeds, and all investments are fully
reversible. Intermediaries do not receive any outside source of income (or transfer) to complement their





























Equation (19) indicates that there is a precise reciprocal link between the net investment in foreign bonds
(expressed in units of the local currency) and the net investment in domestic bonds.
The management protocol of the currency speculators requires them to re-invest every period the wealth
accumulated one period before. Because wealth is continuously re-invested ex post net proﬁts are zero,
and the domestic households who own the stock on these intermediaries receive no dividends. Moreover,
households cannot make deposits or withdraw part of their wealth as they would in a conventional bank.
Therefore, currency speculators are reduced to be merely asset market ‘arbitrageurs’. They trade in interna-
tional asset markets and in doing so they allow for some degree of cross-country risk sharing. This trading
service is what makes intermediation relevant to households, anyway.
The Initial Conditions. I assume that the same initial amount of wealth (in domestic and foreign bonds)
is equally endowed to each intermediary. Financial intermediaries earn proﬁts from arbitraging the diﬀerence
between the market interest rate spread and the expected nominal exchange rate depreciation. They also
obtain the same information in each period. These assumptions guarantee that all ﬁnancial intermediaries
solve an identical problem, and choose the same optimal bond portfolio allocation. Hence, I can drop the
index z and simply consider the case of a representative (myopic) currency speculator.
123.4 The Exogenous Monetary Policy Rules
The government does not issue bonds, but supplies the local currency through the central bank13.F i a t
money is an unbacked asset that serves as a unit of account, and promises one unit of the local currency in







where mt denotes the domestic per capita money supply in logs.
The domestic government’s consolidated budget constraint is such that total transfers to the households,
TRj,t, are exactly equal to seigniorage revenues in every period,




In a pure ﬂoat regime, monetary policy is set independently from developments in the foreign exchange
market. Hence, to be consistent with the implicit assumption that the exchange rate ﬂoats freely, I treat the
monetary policy variable, mt, as an exogenously given, stochastic process. For a discussion of alternative
policy regimes (target zones, ﬁxed exchange rates, etc.) and their implications for exchange rate volatility,
see Jeanne and Rose (2002).
This set-up characterizes the government’s role as fully exogenous instead of building up anew a pair of
informationally-constrained, non-atomistic agents. This simpliﬁcation, though convenient, does not suﬃce
to close down the model. I also assume that the government correctly observes all endogenous variables and
exogenous shocks at time t. Then, after one period, the government reveals all the information collected
up to time t. It must be noted, however, that a public record of the exogenous shocks is necessary only
whenever the economic agents have asymmetric and private information about them.
The setting for the foreign government is similar. Accordingly, the foreign monetary policy is identiﬁed
with the money supply rule m∗
t, which is only legally tendered in the foreign country. Foreign bonds are also
in zero-net supply, and the foreign government’s budget is balanced each period. The public record of the
foreign government is the obvious counterpart to the domestic one.
4 Methodology of the Market Solution
An equilibrium in this model is described by: (i) a consumption-savings decision that maximizes the expected
utility of the households in both countries14; (ii) a pair of price-setting rules that maximizes discounted
proﬁts for the monopolistic ﬁrms, subject to the demand constraints and a linear-in-labor technology; (iii) a
portfolio choice that maximizes next-period net proﬁts and accounts for foreign risk exposure for the ﬁnancial
intermediaries; (iv) a set of prices, interest rates and a nominal exchange rate that clears all markets, given
the optimal strategies of the households, ﬁrms, and ﬁnancial intermediaries; and (v) rational expectations
13This assumption, however, simpliﬁes the model at the expense of ruling out a role for government debt in the dynamics of
the economy.
14Also a commitment to optimal labor supply and money demand rules, given the prevailing CPI prices and wages.
13based on the information available to each agent, and consistent with the laws of motion for the endogenous
variables and the exogenous shocks.
The mathematical derivation of the equilibrium conditions of the model is discussed in the appendix and
a companion technical note. I linearize those equations around the deterministic zero-inﬂation, zero-current
account steady state (see also King et al., 1988). In the steady state, exchange rate depreciation is also zero,
PPP holds and consumption is equalized across countries. I approximate all variables in logs, except the
real net foreign asset position of ﬁnancial intermediaries (in levels) (e.g., P. Benigno, 2001, and Thoenissen
2003). I denote b xt ≡ lnXt − lnX the deviation of a variable in logs from its steady state, and b Xt ≡ Xt−X
C
the deviation of a variable in levels from its steady state relative to steady state consumption.
The appendix summarizes the ﬁrst-order approximation of the model in the IS, MM, AS, RP, RS,
CA and UIP equations. This system fully determines the dynamics of per capita consumption, interest
rates, CPI prices, relative prices, exchange rates and the (real) net foreign asset position in the presence
of sticky prices, incomplete asset markets and asymmetrically-informed agents. I adapt the undetermined
coeﬃcients methodology of Townsend (1983) and Christiano (2002) to handle the added complexity of the
signal extraction problem for households, ﬁrms and ﬁnancial intermediaries.
4.1 The Dynamic System
The original system is composed of 13 diﬀerent equations. If I replace the MM equations and the RP and RS
deﬁnitions inside the IS, AS, CA and UIP equations, I reduce the size of the system to just 8 fundamental
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Let b xt be the (r × 1) vector of all exogenous variables, which may include current and lagged observations
of the TFP, the monetary, and the preference shocks. The elements in b zt and b xt are expressed in deviations
relative to their deterministic steady state values. Note that the composition of b xt depends on the information
structure of the problem, while the elements pertaining to b zt are unchanged.
The linearized equilibrium conditions ﬁti n t oav e c t o rs y s t e mo f8 linear stochastic diﬀerence equations
of order 2, and take the canonical form,
Et [α0b zt+1 + α1b zt + α2b zt−1 + β0b xt+1 + β1b xt]=0 , (23)
for all t =0 ,1,2,...and b z−1 given. The law of motion of b xt is,
b xt = Pb xt−1 +  t, (24)
where  t has zero-mean and is uncorrelated with  t−τ, b xt−τ for all τ>0.T h es y m b o lEt in (23) represents a
conditional expectations operator, which allows the conditioning information set to vary across equations. I
view αi, βi,a n dP as given matrices of dimensions (8 × 8), (8 × r) and (r × r), respectively. I assume that
15The vector e zt is a complete and suﬃcient description of all the endogenous variables at time t. There are other endogenous
variables not included in the vector that are of interest (e.g., nominal interest rates, real exchange rates, relative prices, etc.),
but all such variables are known functions of e zt.
14the rank of α0 is greater than zero and that the (8 × 24) matrix [α0,α 1,α 2] has full row rank. The matrix
P varies depending on the information structure.
The Exogenous Variables and the Information Sets. Id e ﬁne the collection of 6 exogenous shocks
driving the economy as follows,
b θt =
³







each one of them expressed in deviations from the steady state. I conjecture that the dynamics of the
exogenous shocks in the model follow a proper VA R(1) process. I assume that the time series representation
for b θt is given by16,






where the zero-mean random vector of innovations εt is uncorrelated with εt−τ, b θt−τ for all τ>0.O b v i o u s l y ,
t h ea u t o r e g r e s s i v ec o m p o n e n t ,ρ,a n dt h ec o v a r i a n c e ,Ω,a r eb o t h(6 × 6) matrices.
In the standard case with only public information all the information sets are identical, i.e.
Ht = H∗
t = Ft = F∗





Therefore, the vector of exogenous variables b xt only contains the current shocks. I can identify,
b xt = b θt,P= ρ,  t = εt,r=6 , (27)
and ﬁnd the market solution. This is the typical informational structure for linear rational expectations
models in international macroeconomics, where all exogenous shocks are perfectly observable to all economic
agents before they choose their optimal actions. I argue that to make this speciﬁcation consistent I need
to rely on a public mechanism to record and reveal macroeconomic information at all times. But, if the
diﬀusion of information on the exogenous shocks is neither instantaneous nor symmetric across agents, this
solution is no longer valid.
My claim that information diﬀusion is inherently asymmetric is based on the notion that private infor-
mation (on a subset of exogenous shocks) and delays in the release of public data are intrinsic characteristics
of ﬁnancial investments and economic activity. If any of the information sets in (23) does not contain the
whole of b θt, then the vector of exogenous variables b xt must be constructed in a slightly diﬀerent way (from
current and lagged realizations of b θt).
In the benchmark case with p r i v a t ea s y m m e t r i ci n f o r m a t i o n(exotic information sets), governments
release the information always with a one-period (one-quarter) delay. In other words, exogenous shocks
are treated essentially as private information to some agents at time t, but information on all of them is only
made public at time t +1 . I assume that local households observe their corresponding preference shocks,
local ﬁrms know their TFP shocks and ﬁnancial intermediaries have direct knowledge of the monetary supply
16For more details on how to extend the methodology to any stochastic ARMA(p,q) process, see Christiano (2002, footnote
8).
15shocks. Hence, I can say that
Ht =
n



























reﬂects the information available to each type of agent. I also explore several alternatives to this benchmark
in my simulations.
No economic agent has complete information on the current realization of the exogenous shocks whenever
he forecasts the endogenous variables of the system and makes his choices. Therefore, a non-trivial signal
















,r=1 2 , (28)
where I6 denotes the 6−dimensional identity matrix. Obviously, the dimensionality of the solution becomes
more diﬃcult to handle the longer it takes for private information to turn into public (or common knowledge)
data.
4.2 The Solution of the Dynamic System
The solution I postulate for the model is a linear feedback rule relating current endogenous variables to a
set of state variables17 (i.e., b zt−1 and b xt),
b zt = Ab zt−1 + Bb xt, (29)
where the (8 × 8) matrix A (the feedback part) and the (8 × r) matrix B (the feedforward part) are the
‘coeﬃcients to be determined’. Matrix A characterizes the impact of lagged endogenous variables, while
matrix B determines the inﬂuence of current and lagged exogenous shocks. The solution is a sequence {b zt}
which is consistent with: (i) the system (23)−(24) for all b zt−1, b xt, and the initial condition b z−1, and (ii) the
transversality condition lim
τ→∞Etb zt+τ =0 . The transversality condition arises naturally from these linearized
equilibrium conditions, since the model I propose is stationary and should converge towards the steady state
in the long-run.
The Method of Undetermined Coeﬃcients. In order to verify the conjecture in (29), I need to solve
the restrictions that the model imposes on the coeﬃcients A and B.F i r s t ,Ig e tt h a tt h efeedback matrix A
must be the zero of a particular matrix polynomial. That is, A satisﬁes that
α(A) ≡ α0A2 + α1A + α2 = 08×8, (30)
17Given this solution, each economic agent can infer all the contemporaneous endogenous variables e zt from the state variables
(i.e., e zt−1 and e xt) under public information. Notice, however, that this is not true under private asymmetric information.
16where α(A) is a second-order matrix polynomial in A. An important question is whether any of the many
roots of this polynomial satisﬁes the eigenvalue restriction needed to obtain a stable (no-bubbles) solution
and, if so, how many. Finding the eigenvalues of a polynomial equation α(A)=08×8 is a fairly standard
problem. For details on how to obtain the coeﬃcient A whose eigenvalues are less than one in absolute value,
see Anderson and Moore (1985) and Christiano (2002).
Secondly, the feedforward matrix B is the solution to a linear system of equations conditional on A.L e t
me deﬁne the matrix F as,
F =[ β0 + α0B]P +[ β1 +( α0A + α1)B]Ir, (31)
where Ir is the (r × r) identity matrix. In the benchmark case of private asymmetric information,Id e ﬁne
e F by
Et [Fb xt]=e Fb xt, (32)
while F = e F in the standard case of public information. Then, the (8 × r) matrix B must solve the restriction,
e F = 08×r. (33)
Christiano (2002) shows that the system of equations deﬁned in (33) is linear in the non-zero components of
B, and has a solution. The matrix Ω is needed for this mapping whenever some elements of b θt are observed
contemporaneously and others not. In that case, the elements that are not observed must be projected onto
the ones that are, and these projection formula requires the covariance between the various shock innovations.
In other words, the solution to the model is obtained under the assumption that rational agents recognize
the signal extraction problem they face and act accordingly to exploit all the information they have about
the shocks and the stochastic processes driving the economy.
5M o d e l S i m u l a t i o n
I calibrate the model in two steps. First, I employ micro estimates to pin down the structural parameters.
In Table 3 I describe my benchmark parameterization, which follows to a degree the calibrations of Chari et
al. (2002), Selaive and Tuesta (2003), G. Benigno (2004) and G. Benigno and Thoenissen (2006). I choose
the structural parameters to be broadly consistent with the current empirical evidence. Also to highlight the
eﬀects of frictions in the goods and assets markets, and the role of asymmetrically-dispersed (macroeconomic)
information.
Second, I proxy the exogenous shocks using observable variables. I derive a time series realization which
is consistent with the basic structure of the model, and I ﬁtt h es e r i e st oaVA R(1) process. Finally, I
estimate the parameters for the shocks driving the economy (i.e., the autocorrelation matrix, ρ,a n dt h e
variance-covariance matrix, Ω). The literature provides only limited guidance to calibrate the productivity,
money supply and preference shocks simultaneously. Solving the signal extraction problem that arises
whenever current information is private and asymmetrically-dispersed depends crucially on these parameters.
Therefore, the approach described here identiﬁes the autocorrelation matrix and the correlations between
innovations directly from the data. This suﬃces to simulate the model and compute the key moments of
interest.
175.1 The Benchmark Parameterization
Table 3 summarizes my choice of structural parameters. I set the quarterly discount factor, β,e q u a lt o
0.99264. This implies an annualized real rate of return of 3% in steady state. I calibrate the model assuming
that the home country is the U.S. and the foreign country is the Euro-zone. Hence, I assume a symmetric
population size, n,e q u a lt o0.5.
I use the value of 1.5 for the elasticity of intratemporal substitution, σ, and the value of 5 for the coeﬃcient
of relative risk aversion, γ, already applied by Chari et al. (2002) and Selaive and Tuesta (2003). The value
of the coeﬃcient γ is somewhat of a compromise since the parameter choices range between 0.5 and 3 in
Eichenbaum et al. (1988), between 2.81 and 4.69 in Lubik and Schorfheide (2006), and larger than 5 in Hall
(1998).
Bergin and Feenstra (2001) suggest that the elasticity of substitution across varieties, θ,m u s tb ee q u a l
to 3 in order to approximate the 60% average mark-up estimated by Domowitz et al. (1988). Chari et al.
(2002) and G. Benigno (2004), instead, propose a value as high as 10. They target a mark-up of merely 11%
based on the ﬁndings of Basu (1996). Following the estimates of Rotemberg and Woodford (1998a, 1998b),
I choose a degree of monopolistic competition equal to 7.88 for an average mark-up of 14.53%.
I use the value of 0.47 proposed by Selaive and Tuesta for the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply, ϕ. However, this parameter is not an easy pick. On one hand, Rotemberg and Woodford (1998a,
1998b) explain that the inverse of the Frisch elasticity needs to be as low as 0.1052 to match the relatively
weak observed-response of real wages to monetary disturbances and other macro features of the labor market.
On the other hand, this is at odds with the empirical micro literature (e.g., Card, 1994, and Browning et
al., 1999). Micro studies indicate that the inverse of the Frisch elasticity lies signiﬁcatively above 1.T h i s
evidence has compelled Bergin and Feenstra (2001) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2006) to choose a value of
1,G u s tet al. (2006) to select 1.5 and G. Benigno (2004) to favor 2. Instead, my selection emphasizes the
macroeconomic role of the parameter.
A composite of the Bayesian estimates in Lubik and Schorfheide (2006)18 suggests that a reasonable rate
of habit formation, b, ranges between 0.0098 and 0.3358.B o l d r i net al. (2001), instead, defend that habit
persistence should be as high as 0.73. In the benchmark, I select the habit rate to be equal to 0 in order
to avoid excessive consumption smoothing. I also experiment with values between 0 and 0.7 to assess the
signiﬁcance of habits for the dynamics of the real and nominal exchange rates.
Galí et al. (2001) report that the degree of nominal price rigidity in the U.S. lies in the interval between
0.407 and 0.66 (the average is 0.5335) for the sample period 1970:I-1998:II. They also locate the price rigidity
for the E.M.U. in the interval between 0.67 and 0.77 (the average is 0.72) for the same period range19.I n
the benchmark, I ﬁx the price rigidity of contracts to be equal across ﬁrms and markets, setting its value
to 0.62. This parametric choice is the equally-weighted average of the mean price rigidity in the U.S. and
the E.M.U. based on Galí et al.’s (2001) ﬁndings. Accordingly, the corresponding contract average duration
18The rate of habit formation in Lubik and Schorheide (2006) is decomposed into the product of habit persistence, h,a n d
the steady state growth rate of a world-wide technology shock, γ.
19Galí et al.’s (2001) estimates are broadly consistent with the current consensus in the literature which suggests that the
Calvo-parameter in the U.S. is consistently lower than in Europe. Other references include Bils and Klenow (2004), Galí and
Rabanal (2005), Schorfheide (2005), and Rabanal and Rubio-Ramírez (2003, 2005) for the U.S. For European estimates of the
degree of price stickiness I should also mention the works of Benigno and López-Salido (2002), Angeloni et al. (2004), and
Rabanal and Rubio-Ramírez (2003, 2005).
18is of 2.63 quarters (or 7.89 months). I also explore diﬀerent degrees of price rigidity based on Galí et al.’s
(2001) range of estimates for each market.
P. Benigno (2001), Selaive and Tuesta (2003) and G. Benigno and Thoenissen (2006) among others favor







, which corresponds to a 10 basis points spread
(per quarter) of the domestic interest rate in the foreign currency over the foreign rate. Still, this is slightly
lower than the Bayesian estimate of 0.007 provided by Rabanal and Tuesta (2006). In the benchmark, I
choose a conservative value of 0 to ensure that ﬁnancial intermediaries are risk-neutral. I also study the
response of the model under values as high as 0.007.
5.2 The Dynamics of the Exogenous Shocks
To simulate the model, I still need to calibrate the parameters of the VA R (1) process for b θt.I d o s o b y
relying on proxies for the shocks to estimate (26). The time series data used in these calculations is described
in the appendix, and the estimation results are summarized in Tables 4( a), 4( b) and 4( c).
A Time Series Realization of Proxies. I identify three diﬀerent types of exogenous shocks. First, the
monetary policy shocks, b mt and b m∗
t. The time series realization of the (per capita) money supply or money
with zero maturity is obtained directly from the data. Second, the so-called TFP shocks, b at and b a∗
t.S i n c eI
assume that the production technology is linear-in-labor, the TFP series is constructed as (per capita) real
GDP relative to (per capita) employment.
Finally, I interpret the preference shocks, ∆b ξt and ∆b ξ
∗
t, as unanticipated changes in the subjective
discount factor. I assume these shocks are proportional to ex post deviations of the (gross) real interest rate






















































, ∀τ ≥ 0,








. Taking logs on both expressions
and re-writing the variables in deviations from their steady state values, I describe the preference shocks
simply as,
∆b ξt+1 ≈ μ
³













I anticipate the subjective discount factor shocks to be very persistent, but of low volatility. I pick a small
scaling factor of μ =0 .1 to dampen the magnitude of the ﬂuctuations. The speciﬁcation in equations
(34) − (35) implicitly treats the preference shocks, b ξt and b ξ
∗
t,a sap a i ro fI (1) random processes.
19Estimation of the Exogenous Vector of Shocks b θt. I collect the transformed data proxying for the
shocks in the vector b θt =
³






. Consistent with the speciﬁcation in equation (26),I
argue that the time series representation of b θt is given by,






where the zero-mean random variable εt is uncorrelated with εt−τ, b θt−τ for all τ>0.I u s e E - v i e w s 6
to estimate this unrestricted, stationary VA R(1) with a sample ranging between 1974:I and 2006:III, and
no constant term. This allows me to directly estimate the matrix b ρ. I compute the matrix of variance-
covariances, b Ω,f r o mt h er e s i d u a ls e r i e s .T h e n ,Ia s s u m et h a tb o t hb ρ and b Ω correspond to the true matrices
ρ and Ω that characterize the dynamics of the exogenous shocks20.
6 Quantitative Findings21
Figure 1 plots the volatility relative to domestic consumption and the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of the
real exchange rate under the assumption that price stickiness is identical across markets and ﬁrms (i.e.,
αH = αH∗ = αF = αF∗ = α). I calibrate all parameters according to my benchmark parameterization,
except for α that takes diﬀerent values along the unit interval (horizontal axis). I report the predictions of
the model for the benchmark of asymmetric information and the alternative of symmetric information. I
also interpolate the approximate contour of the volatility ratio and the autocorrelation as if it was a function
of α.
The ﬁrst-order autocorrelation of the real exchange rate is almost identical under either symmetric or
asymmetric information. Furthermore, the mapping of the autocorrelation function lies on top of the 45
degree line for values of α up to 0.60 − 0.65, and is only slightly lower for Calvo parameters above that.
Further exploration reveals that this tight link survives in the presence of other frictions (e.g., habit formation
or risk-averse ﬁnancial intermediaries) and even if nominal rigidities vary across ﬁrms depending on their
location. This may explain why models that rely on Calvo (1983) price-setting ﬁrms have a diﬃcult time
matching the persistence of the real exchange rate, because matching the persistence requires α>0.84 (or
an average contract duration above 6.25 quarters).
Table 5 indicates that diﬀerences in the degree of price stickiness across markets and ﬁrms (e.g., G.
Benigno, 2004) provide a way to increase the persistence of the real exchange rate without requiring a degree
of price stickiness well above the estimates in Galí et al. (2001) and others. For example, in columns SSM
and DSFM of Table 5 the average degree of price stickiness is somewhere around 0.62, and yet the model
generates signiﬁcatively more real exchange rate persistence (between 0.695 and 0.796). These ﬁndings clearly
suggests that diﬀerences in price stickiness across markets are crucial to generate the desired persistence22.
20I tried alternative ways to infer the dynamics of e θt, for instance, using other proxies for the preference shocks. Naturally,
the coeﬃcients ρ and Ω vary depending on the choice of proxies.
21I exclude habit formation on the part of households and treat the ﬁnancial intermediaries as risk-neutral ﬁrms in the
benchmark model. In this sense, the structure of the bond economy is somewhat comparable to that of Chari et al. (2002).
22For instance, the autocorrelation of the real exchange rate is as high as 0.93 whenever δ =0 .001, αH =0 .407, αF =0 .69,
αH∗ =0 .66 and αF∗ =0 .75. This calibration produces very persistent series across the board.
20Figure 1 also shows that the real exchange rate volatility relative to consumption is non-linear in the
degree of price stickiness α. The volatility of the nominal exchange rate remains stable for most α’s. For
low values of α, instead, the volatility on consumption tends to be quite high and decreasing rapidly, while
the volatility of the real exchange rate is low and grows more gradually. The raise in the volatility ratio seen
in Figure 1 is mostly due to the drop in the volatility of consumption. For middle values of α, the reduction
in the volatility of consumption becomes smaller and the increase in the volatility of the real exchange rate
picks up some speed. For high values of α, the volatility of the real exchange rates stabilizes while the
volatility of consumption slightly edges up. This explains the levelling of the volatility ratio in Figure 1.
Seemingly, the model insulates ﬂuctuations of the nominal exchange rate from nominal rigidities. There-
fore, changes in the degree of price stickiness are absorbed mostly by increases in the volatility of the real
exchange rate, and reductions in the volatility of per capita consumption and relative CPI prices. Nonethe-
less, matching the volatility ratio still requires α>0.75 (or an average contract duration above 4 quarters).
However, the message of Figure 1 is that asymmetric information introduces more real exchange rate volatil-
ity relative to consumption for any given α. For example, in column SSFM of Table 5 t h ed e g r e eo fp r i c e
stickiness is 0.62 (my benchmark calibration), and the model generates a volatility ratio of 5.029 under asym-
metric information compared against 3.634 under symmetric information. This evidence clearly suggests that
informational frictions are crucial to generate the desired exchange rate volatility.
Table 5 contains other interesting predictions. The model attains a high correlation between the nominal
and the real exchange rates, except in cases where the contract average duration is asymmetric across markets.
Most ﬁrst-order autocorrelations remain largely unaﬀected by the structure of the information set except for
terms of trade. The drop in the persistence of terms of trade can be as high as 20 percent relative to the case
of symmetric information. The model produces encouraging results for diﬀerent measures of international
risk-sharing too. Most speciﬁcations match well the volatility and persistence of relative consumption and
the correlation between consumption in each country. Moreover, the model produces a very low correlation
between relative consumption and the real exchange rate. The correlation tends to be larger when the degree
of price stickiness varies across markets, but lower under asymmetric information23.
Hence, the model predictions appear to ﬁt the data better and are either consistent with or improve upon
the ﬁndings of Bergin and Feenstra (2001), Chari et al. (2002) and Selaive and Tuesta (2003).
6.1 The Role of Asymmetric Information24
Asymmetric information makes households less responsive to current shocks, other than preference shocks.
That means that consumption responses come with a lag, although they could be very sensitive to random
shifts in preferences. The portfolio allocation of the ﬁnancial intermediaries is essentially responsible for the
determination of the nominal exchange rate. The model retains the feature that nominal exchange rates
23The less public information there is about current shocks, the worst agents are in forecasting the state of the economy.
Therefore, agents are less likely to ﬁnd ways to share risks across countries by trading. For instance, the benchmark of
asymmetric information induces a correlation between the real exchange rate and relative consumption which is as much as 34
percent lower than in the case of symmetric information. This ﬁnding supports the notion that informational frictions are a
relevant part in the explanation of the real exchange rate-relative consumption anomaly.
24Further exploration not reported here indicates that the predictions under either asymmetric information or asymmetric
information plus common knowledge about productivity shocks are quite similar. This suggets that lack of current information
on preference shocks and particularly on monetary policy dominates the ﬁndings.
21are primarily driven by monetary supply shocks25. Arguably, the volatility of the nominal exchange rate
does not vary too much because intermediaries have full access to current information on monetary policy
shocks under the benchmark of asymmetric information. Similarly, the pricing rules of the re-optimizing
ﬁrms become less responsive too.
The evidence on prices shows, for instance, that the volatility of the relative CPI price over domestic
consumption in Table 5 d r o p sb ya sm u c ha s10 percent under asymmetric information. Nonetheless, the
dynamics of equilibrium prices are much more complex than what this number alone reveals. The volatility
of the real exchange rate relative to consumption is up to 38 percent higher and the volatility of terms of
trade relative to consumption is up to 28 percent higher under asymmetric information. These predictions
reﬂect the increasing reliance on terms of trade and the real exchange rate to switch expenditures across
countries and adjust the current account in response to country-speciﬁcs h o c k s .
These expenditure-switching eﬀects acquire a larger role whenever informational frictions make consump-
tion less responsive. I describe the linearization of the resource constraint in the appendix and the companion
technical note. Simple algebra with the CA, RS and RP equations in the appendix allows me to re-write
the constraint as follows,
β b BRF
t ≈ b BRF
t−1 +( 1− n)
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C represents the (real) per capita
net foreign asset position instrumented by the representative ﬁnancial intermediary relative to steady state
consumption, and the expression within the brackets determines the current account in real terms.
One robust feature of the model is that the real net foreign asset position tends to be very persistent.
Then, not surprisingly, most of the adjustment of the current account required for the goods markets in
both countries to clear has to come from ﬂuctuations of terms of trade and/or the real exchange rate. In
other words, the higher volatility of the real exchange rate and terms of trade has to do with the fact that
both variables respond more in order to ensure that the less sensitive household’s demands remain optimal
at equilibrium and all markets clear.
Why Relative CPI prices (and Terms of Trade) are so Volatile? My interpretation is that Calvo
staggered prices may be less restrictive than we thought. The high volatility of relative CPI prices, also noted
by Chari et al. (2002), partly indicates that consumption prices provide a great deal of the adjustment needed
to hedge against shocks26. This is so even in the presence of nominal rigidities and informational frictions.
Calvo (1983) imposes a "restriction" on the timing of price adjustments, but it does not constraint the size
or the sign of the price adjustment when it occurs. This is probably what matters most, because due to the
inherent symmetry of their problem and the unconstrained nature of their choice, the action of individual
re-optimizing ﬁrms can compensate in the aggregate for the ﬁrms who cannot change prices (if need be).
CPI prices and terms of trade can be accommodated by the actions of the subset of re-optimizing ﬁrms in
25A variance decomposition for the benchmark of asymmetric information shows that monetary policy shocks account for
approximately 50% of the volatility of the nominal exchange rate.
26A subtle implication is that because trade in the goods market (and the corresponding movement of prices) provides
suﬃcient insurance to households, the beneﬁts of participating in the asset market are greatly reduced. Consequently, asset
market frictions often have quantitatively small eﬀects.
22order to help consumers attain an "appropriate" consumption path. This, in turn, ensures an optimal proﬁle
of proﬁts for each ﬁrm. Aggregate consumption in both countries inﬂuences the equilibrium in the labor
market, and hence the wages paid by each ﬁrm. Re-optimizing ﬁrms set their prices, aggregate prices respond
in kind, and their ﬂuctuations provide households with some degree of "insurance" in the goods markets
against country-speciﬁc shocks. As a result, ﬁrms obtain a smoother proﬁle of wages and marginal costs
over time. Firms are aware that re-optimization events are infrequent, but they internalize their inﬂuence
on aggregate variables (particularly, consumption and CPI prices) in their expectations and act accordingly.
In summary, ﬁrms are capable of moving aggregate prices as much as it is required to accomplish their
goals, and they greatly depend on large movements in relative prices (real exchange rate, terms of trade,
etc.) to induce the appropriate expenditure switches across markets. These expenditure-switching eﬀects
(for instance, on the current account) are needed for all markets to clear given the optimal plans of each
agent. Hence, I would argue that the channel through which asymmetric information operates to increase
the real exchange rate volatility depends crucially on the particular model of nominal rigidities devised by
Calvo (1983).
6.2 The Role of Nominal Rigidities
The excessive volatility of relative CPI prices (even under symmetric information) reveals a deeper issue
about nominal rigidities. Based on equation RS in the appendix, the variance of the real exchange rate
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which holds true up to a ﬁrst-order approximation on CPI prices (and rounding-up error). Similarly, I
approximate the correlation between the nominal and real exchange rates as,
ρ(b rs,b s) ≈
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Notice that the correlation between the nominal exchange rate and the relative CPI price appears in all
three equations.
If the law of one price holds, then the nominal exchange rate equals b s = b p∗−b p ≡− b pR, and the correlation
w i t ht h er e l a t i v eC P Ip r i c eb e c o m e sρ(b s, b p∗ − b p)=−1. The law fails due to LCP pricing coupled with
nominal rigidities. However, Table 5 indicates that the correlation still ranges between −0.728 and −0.929.
The model gets the sign right, and is capable of reducing the absolute value of the correlation by more than
20 percent for certain speciﬁcations. But these numbers are too far apart from the correlation of −0.314
27Equation (40) is derived based on the fact that if a solution to the model exists, then the vector of endogenous variables
given by (29) is covariance-stationary.
23found in the data28. Mechanically, the model approximates the variance of the exchange rates relative to
consumption by balancing out a highly negative cross-correlation with an excessively large volatility of the
relative CPI price. The correlation between the nominal exchange rate and the current (and lagged) relative
CPI price has also a non-negligible impact on the measured and predicted values of ρ(b rs,b s) and ρ(b rs).
The bottom line is that in order to produce realistic second-order moments is critical to match certain
correlations too. In turn, this means that it is necessary to understand how nominal rigidities aﬀect the
dynamics of CPI prices in this class of models. I describe the linearization of the ﬁrst-order conditions
of the ﬁrm and the corresponding coeﬃcients in the appendix and the companion technical note. After
simple algebra on equations ASH, ASH∗, ASF,a n dASF∗ in the appendix, it can be shown that the pricing
discrepancy across markets for an average ﬁr ml o c a t e di nt h eh o m ec o u n t r ys a t i s ﬁes that,
b π
H











E[b st |F t] −
¡
b pH












t ,b ct,b ct−1,b c∗
t, b rst,b tt,b t∗





while the pricing diﬀerence for an average ﬁrm located in the foreign market satisﬁes that,
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The functions Ωi ¡
·;αi − αi∗¢
for i = H,F are linear in the variables, reﬂect local marginal costs in the
location of the producer, and satisfy that ΩH (·;0)=ΩF (·;0)=0.
As noted by G. Benigno (2004), these functions imply that the diﬀerence in the ﬁrms’ price-setting
rules across markets no longer depends solely on ﬂuctuations of the nominal exchange rate. Assuming that
nominal rigidities are the same across ﬁrms (i.e., αH = αH∗ and αF = αF∗) implies that the equilibrium
path of the pricing diﬀerential becomes tied down to the ﬂuctuations of the equilibrium nominal exchange
rate. Assuming that the nominal rigidities are the same across ﬁrms (i.e., αH = αH∗ and αF = αF∗), the
pricing diﬀerential of each ﬁrm can be re-stated as follows,
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This formula is somewhat unusual because it involves a forecast of the current nominal exchange rate,
instead of the nominal exchange rate itself. Arguably, asymmetries of information may have an impact on
the ﬁrm’s forecast and, consequently, also on the ex post observed degree of pass-through. If the forecasts
are systematically less volatile than the nominal exchange rate, this may induce a lower pass-through. This
is a ﬁner point that I will not pursue further because it goes beyond the purpose of the paper. In any event,
the equilibrium path of the pricing diﬀerential is clearly tied down to the ﬂuctuations of the equilibrium
nominal exchange rate.
28My experiments suggest that asymmetric information plays a role, albeit a limited one, in toning down the correlation
between the nominal exchange rate and the relative CPI price.
24For expositional purposes, let me further simplify things by assuming that all current information is
public (i.e., Ht = H∗
t = Ft = F∗
t = It) and that price stickiness is identical across ﬁrms and markets (i.e.,
αH = αH∗ = αF = αF∗ = α). Hence, using equation RS in the appendix, equations (41) and (42),a n dt h e
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. These pair of equations reveal the strong linkage that exists between the relative
CPI price and the real exchange rate with the nominal exchange rate. Asymmetric information and diﬀer-
ences in price stickiness across ﬁrms are bound to have an impact. However, the dramatic break occurs only
when the nominal rigidities diﬀer across at least one market. In that case, the function Ωi ¡
·;αi − αi∗¢
is no
longer equal to zero for some i = H,F, and the implicit relationship between the nominal exchange rate and
the pricing diﬀerential no longer holds tightly.
Indeed, the evidence from Tables 5, 6 and 7 suggests that this pricing "wedge" lowers (in absolute value)
the correlations with the nominal exchange rate. However, in most instances the change in the correlation
between the real and nominal exchange rate is proportionally greater. The eﬀects introduced by this pricing
"wedge" are mixed. On one hand, it improves the ability of the model to match the persistence and, most
importantly, the volatility of the real exchange rate as can be seen in Table 5. For comes from lowering the
c o r r e l a t i o no ft h er e l a t i v eC P Ip r i c ew i t ht h en o m i n a le x c h a n g er a t e( s e ee q u a t i o n s(38) and (40)). On the
other hand, it often generates another anomaly in the form of too little correlation between the nominal and
the real exchange rates because it reduces the volatility of the nominal exchange rate while increasing the
relative CPI price29 (see equation (39)).
Once more, the approach to model nominal rigidities in the spirit of Calvo (1983) in the version proposed
by G. Benigno (2004) proves to have far reaching implications for the exchange rate predictions of the model.
7 Sensitivity Analysis
The Contribution of Risk-Averse Financial Intermediaries. I describe the linearization of the ﬁrst-
order condition of the representative ﬁnancial intermediary in the appendix and the companion technical
note. In the presence of risk-averse ﬁnancial intermediaries (i.e., if δ>0), deviations of the uncovered
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29Table 5 shows that the correlation may be better approximated if the uncovered interest rate parity condition fails in the
presence of risk-averse ﬁnancial intermediaries.
25This corresponds to equation UIP in the appendix. A natural conjecture would be that the persistence of
b BRF
t may carry over to the nominal exchange rate. In fact, the evidence reported in Table 6 indicates that
t h ec h o i c eo ft h eδ parameter has little to do with the persistence of the nominal exchange rate partially
because it is already quite high when δ =0 .
However, the volatility of the exchange rates, the relative CPI price and the terms of trade relative to
consumption tends to be lower for larger values of δ. The more risk averse ﬁnancial intermediaries are (or
conversely, the larger δ is), the costlier it gets for ﬁnancial intermediaries to bear the exchange rate risk.
Hence, ﬁnancial markets become closer to "autarky" and the nominal exchange rate becomes less volatile.
The downward bias of the real exchange rate and the relative CPI price comes from the linkages to the
nominal exchange rate explored in equations (41) − (42).
I describe the linearization of the Euler equations of the representative households in the appendix and the
companion technical note. I use equation RS in the appendix and the assumption of symmetric information
across households (i.e., Ht = H∗






























































Independently of the information structure, consumption fails to equalize across countries in expectations
whenever preference shocks are asymmetric, PPP fails or the UIP condition is violated. Equation (48) shows
that a weakened link between the real exchange rate and relative consumption can be rationalized with
forecasting disagreements arising from asymmetrically-informed households and ﬁnancial intermediaries or
with risk-averse intermediaries (i.e., δ>0).
Table 6 shows that the contribution of δ to explain the real exchange rate-relative consumption anomaly
is very modest. In most of my experiments, the real net foreign asset position tends to be very persistent over
time. This means that movements in b BRF
t are not very sensitive to the dynamics of the other endogenous
variables. Therefore, this channel becomes not very relevant in practice (see also Selaive and Tuesta, 2003).
The Contribution of Habit Formation on Consumption. Table 7 shows that habit formation plays
only a limited role. As the parameter b raises, the volatility of relative consumption goes down, the correlation
between domestic and foreign consumption goes up, and the volatility of the exchange rate and the terms
of trade increases. A natural conjecture is that habits increase the persistence of consumption and this has
spillover eﬀects on other endogenous variables. In practice, the model already generates very persistent series
for consumption without requiring habits. Therefore, there is little room for this channel to work. In the
end, habit formation has mainly the eﬀect of increasing the correlation of the business cycle across countries.
268C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
I show that access to information plays a critical role in shaping the second-order moments of the model.
Neither goods market frictions (sticky prices and LCP pricing) nor asset market frictions (incomplete markets
coupled with intermediation) fully replicate the dynamics of the exchange rates. In fact, the international
borrowing costs of intermediation (see also P. Benigno, 2001) play only a marginal role in my benchmark of
asymmetric information. The pricing wedge in LCP pricing postulated by G. Benigno (2004) has, however,
a notable eﬀect on persistence, the correlation of the nominal exchange rate with the relative CPI price and
other key correlations.
I ﬁnd that the model with frictions on both assets and goods markets, but no informational friction,
approximates the volatility and persistence of the real exchange rate only for large degrees of price stickiness
corresponding to an average contract duration above 4 quarters. These predictions are comparable to those
of Chari et al. (2002), Selaive and Tuesta (2003) and Benigno and Thoenissen (2006). However, the model
fails to replicate the volatilities of the nominal exchange rate, the CPI price and the terms of trade. Among
other counterfactual predictions, it also generates evidence of risk-sharing across countries beyond the values
found in the data and a slightly lower correlation between the nominal and real exchange rates.
In response to these observations, I adapt the model to account for sticky and asymmetric information
across agents. These frictions are relevant to explain the data precisely along the dimensions where the
standard model fails allowing me to better understand the dynamics of the exchange rates. I argue that the
model operates the way it does because whenever agents are informationally-constrained, their responses are
lagged and re-balancing consumption expenditures across countries requires a more volatile exchange rate.
G. Benigno’s (2004) framework of asymmetric price stickiness between the local and the exports markets
is shown to have a direct impact on the persistence of the real exchange rate and other key correlations.
This also allows forecasting disagreements due to asymmetric information to play an indirect role in the
formation of prices and, therefore, in the persistence of the exchange rates and the correlation with each
other. Arguably, the most notable contribution of this approach is to weaken the link between the nominal
exchange rate and the relative CPI price embedded in most models of Calvo price-setting.
My investigation shows that informational frictions or limited diﬀusion of information can closely ap-
proximate the volatility, the persistence and the correlation of the exchange rates. Moreover, it can be
accomplished without imposing an average contract duration that is well above the best-known estimates
in the empirical literature (see, e.g., Galí et al., 2001). It also simultaneously produces sensible predictions
for the structure of cross-correlations among the endogenous variables. Nevertheless, two major challenges
remain largely unresolved.
On one hand, the model with asymmetric information improves in terms of the real exchange rate-relative
consumption anomaly, although it does not provide a complete answer to the puzzle. On the other hand,
I still detect the strong eﬀects of the terms of trade anomaly under LCP pricing (see Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ,
2000a). I leave these two elusive problems for future research. A possible extension to deal with these
two puzzles could be to augment the model with distribution services (e.g., Corsetti et al., 2004) and to
move from a LCP pricing framework to a mix of PCP (or producer-currency) pricing and LCP pricing (e.g.,
Devereux and Engel, 2006).
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31Appendix
A Equilibrium Conditions
Here, I present the relevant equilibrium conditions of the model. Since the model is built around two mostly
symmetric countries, all the equations reported correspond to the home country unless otherwise noted.
More details can be found in the companion technical note.
A.1 The Households’ First-Order Conditions
The Demand Functions of Household j. Each household j decides how much to allocate to the
diﬀerent varieties of home and foreign goods. Given the structure of preferences, the solution to the sub-











































j,t , if f ∈ (n,1], (A.2)



































The Optimization Problem for the Representative Household. The (interior) optimal allocation






















































































plus the appropriate no-Ponzi games, transversality conditions and the budget constraint of both represen-
tative households. Equations (A.5) and (A.6) represent the home and foreign Euler equations obtained by
optimally choosing the holdings of the local bonds denominated in their respective currencies. Equations
(A.7) and (A.8) deﬁne the money demand functions (similar to Cagan’s own). Households pre-commit to
equating the marginal rate of substitution between real money balances and consumption to the opportu-
nity cost of holding real money balances. Finally, equations (A.9) and (A.10) determine the labor supply
functions. Households pre-commit to equating the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
labor to real wages.
A.2 The Firms’ First-Order Conditions
The Downward-Slopping Demand Constraint. I derive the demand of variety h i nt h eh o m ea n d
foreign markets by combining equations (A.1)−(A.4) and aggregating across all households. Then, e Y d
t,t+τ (h)
and e Y d∗
t,t+τ (h) indicate the per capita demand for any variety h at home and abroad respectively, given that
prices e Pt (h) and e P∗




























Similarly, I obtain e Y d
t,t+τ (f) and e Y d∗
t,t+τ (f) to characterize the demand constraints of the foreign ﬁrms.
The Optimal Price-Setting Rule. The necessary and suﬃcient ﬁrst-order conditions for the domestic
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Ξt,t+τ e Y d∗
t,t+τ (h)St+τ |F t
i , (A.14)
33where I allow for diﬀerences in the degree of nominal price rigidity across and within countries. Under proper
aggregation rules, the price sub-indexes under sticky prices on domestic varieties, PH
t and PH∗



















































The price-setting rule is symmetric for all ﬁrms who can re-optimize at time t. The lagged term reﬂects the
aggregate behavior of all domestic ﬁrms who cannot re-set prices. Similar conditions, pricing rules and price
sub-indexes hold for the foreign ﬁrms.
A.3 The Financial Intermediaries’ First-Order Conditions











Hence, ﬁnancial intermediaries are the only agents with a non-trivial portfolio choice problem. Although
their strategy is purely myopic and does not incorporate an intertemporal hedging component, they still
arbitrage any (and all) proﬁt opportunities available in the bond markets such that (A.17) holds true. In
turn, this introduces a risk premium on the uncovered interest rate parity condition which depends linearly
on the disutility from foreign risk, λ.
A.4 The Resource Constraint
If I aggregate the budget constraint of the domestic households with the consolidated domestic government
budget constraint, I obtain
Bt
exp(it)

















which deﬁnes the home country resource constraint. The resource constraint of the foreign country is
redundant by Walras’ law, having assumed that proﬁts from ﬁnancial intermediation are purely re-invested.
The diﬀerence between total income and total consumption in the home country is deﬁned as the current
account.
Let BH
t denote the per capita net domestic asset position of the representative ﬁnancial intermediary. If
I combine equations (A.18) and (19) with the market clearing condition in the domestic bonds market, i.e.
Bt + BH
t =0 , (A.19)
































Pt represents the (real) per capita net foreign asset position instrumented by the represen-
tative ﬁnancial intermediary.
B The Linearized Equilibrium Conditions
Here, I discuss the linearized equilibrium conditions of the model. The linearization of the sticky-price,
intermediated-asset market model with asymmetrically-informed agents is expressed in the following system
of equations,
The Optimal Decision of Households and Firms:
ISH γ
1−bE[∆b ct+1 − b∆b ct |H t] ≈ E
h
b it − nb π
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H∗
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t,
The Resource Constraint:
CA β b BRF
t ≈ b BRF
t−1 +( 1− n)
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B.1 The Demand- and Supply-Side of the Economy
The IS Equations. The IS equations, ISH and ISF, are derived directly from a log linear approximation of
the Euler equations (A.5) and (A.6). I also use the deﬁnition of the price indexes, Pt and P∗
t .T h e s ef o r m u l a s
show that the price dynamics matter in order to determine the consumption path for each representative
household. Therefore, the structure of ﬁrms becomes relevant to understand the path of consumption. Habit
formation and monetary policy, in as much as it inﬂuences the evolution of the nominal interest rate, are
important constraints too.




E[∆b ct+1 − b∆b ct |H t] − E
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where I denote the inﬂation of the bundle i = H,F as b π
i
t+1 ≡ b pi
t+1−b pi
t. I argue that the expected consumption
growth rate diﬀerential across countries is aﬀected by the habit, the nominal interest rates, the dynamics
of prices for domestic and foreign ﬁrms, and preference shocks. I interpret the arguments inside the ﬁrst
bracket on the right-hand side of the equation as the diﬀerence between Fisher’s real interest rate at home
and abroad. This risk-sharing condition also depends on the diﬀerent information available to households
in either country.
The MM Equations. The MM equations, MM H and MM F, are easily derived from the money-market
clearing conditions. A pair of stable money demand functions à la Cagan is obtained from the log linear
approximation of the representative household’s ﬁrst-order conditions in (A.7) and (A.8). The demand for
real balances depends on the nominal interest rate, per capita consumption (instead of aggregate output),
habit formation, consumption prices, and monetary shocks.












t − bb cR
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where the relative consumption is deﬁned as b cR
t ≡ b ct−b c∗
t and the interest rate spread asb iR
t ≡b it−b i∗
t.I no t h e r
words, the interest rate diﬀerential moves with relative monetary shocks, relative consumption (adjusted by
the habit) across countries, and relative CPI prices.
The AS Equations30. The AS equations, AS
H, AS
H∗, AS
F and ASF∗,c o m ef r o mam o d e lw i t hC a l v o -
style price-setting ﬁrms and LCP pricing. The pair of equations ASH and AS
H∗ is obtained from the log
linearization of the optimal price-setting rules, equations (A.13) and (A.14), and the home and foreign price
sub-indexes of the domestic bundle, equations (A.15) and (A.16). Similarly, I derive the pair ASF and ASF∗
from the log linearization of the foreign ﬁrms’ ﬁrst-order conditions and the price sub-indexes of the foreign
bundle of goods.
The inﬂation dynamics depend on the expectations of the future inﬂation rate given all the available
information, and deviations of the real marginal cost from steady state. The speciﬁcation of the real marginal
cost is linked to output demand through the market clearing conditions and the linearity of technology. I
obtain the log linear approximation of the labor supply functions from the representative household’s ﬁrst-
order conditions in (A.9) and (A.10). I also approximate the domestic output demand described in (A.11)
and (A.12), and the corresponding counterparts for the foreign output demand. Then, I observe that the
30An important feature of my model is that while preferences and technologies are symmetric, the nominal side (pricing
contracts) is more asymmetric. This shows up on the aggregate supply (or AS)e q u a t i o n s .
37real marginal cost moves with relative prices in both currencies, per capita consumption, the real exchange
rate, and random TFP shocks.
Other Deﬁnitions. The RP equations, RP, are directly derived from the deﬁnitions of relative prices
in (8). They show that movements in relative prices depend on the inﬂation diﬀerential between imported
goods and local goods expressed in units of the local currency. These deﬁnitions point out that relative prices
are directly linked to the price-setting strategy of ﬁrms. The model is completed with the RS equation, RS,
which approximates the real exchange rate as a weighted combination of the nominal exchange rate and the
ﬁrms’ pricing diﬀerences across markets. This characterization is based upon the log linear approximation
o ft h ed o m e s t i cC P Ip r i c ei n(4), its symmetric foreign counterpart, and the deﬁnition of the real exchange
rate itself in (7).
B.2 The Current Account and the Role of Financial Intermediaries
The CA Equation. I linearize the resource constraint, equation (A.20), around its deterministic steady
state. The approximation is with respect to the level of real net foreign assets and the log of per capita
consumption and prices. As a consequence, I derive the fundamental CA equation, CA, as follows
β b BRF
t ≈ b BRF
t−1 + b cat, (B.5)
b cat ≡ (1 − n)
£
(σ − 1)b tW




where b cat measures the per capita (real) current account and b tW
t ≡ nb tt −(1 − n)b t∗







C represents the real per capita net foreign asset position instrumented by the
representative ﬁnancial intermediary, relative to domestic steady state consumption. Hence, changes in b BRF
t
can be interpreted as movements in the capital account. The CA equation is similar to the expression derived
by Thoenissen (2003) around the zero-current account steady state.
The UIP Condition. The UIP equation, UIP, comes from the log linearization of the representative
ﬁnancial intermediary’s ﬁrst-order condition in (A.17).D e v i a t i o n s o f t h e UIP condition, hence, are pro-
portional to the position in real net foreign assets taken by the intermediary, and unrelated to the LOOP
condition. Unless the current account is balanced each period, the UIP condition does not hold, i.e.
E
h
∆b st+1 −b iR




and the spread in nominal interest rates reﬂects movements in the expected exchange rate and a foreign
exchange risk premium. The premium is time-varying and depends on the size of the real net foreign asset
position, b BRF







. The composite parameter δ measures
the elasticity of the interest rate diﬀerential to movements in real net foreign assets. The risk premium is
positive or negative depending on whether the ﬁnancial intermediary is a borrower or a lender for the home
country.
31Whenever e tW
t > 0, then foreign-produced goods are relatively more expensive and world demand is shifted towards home-
produced goods.
38C Description of the Dataset
I identify the United States with the home country and the 12 member country Euro-zone (Austria, Belgium,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) with the
foreign country. I also report some data for the United Kingdom for comparison purposes. Whenever
possible I use data sources comparable to those of Chari et al. (2002), and similarly collect all quarterly
data spanning the post-Bretton Woods period of 1973:I-2006:III (for a total of 135 observations per series).
The sample period considered ends up before Slovenia became a member of the Euro-zone in January 2007.
All data (except nominal prices, interest rates and exchange rates) is seasonally adjusted.
The Euro currency was introduced in non-physical form (travellers’ checks, electronic transfers, banking,
etc.) and the bilateral exchange rates where locked for all participating countries on January 1, 1999 (on June
19, 2000 for Greece). The new notes and coins did not circulate until January 1st, 2002. Whenever available,
I rely on aggregate data computed by the OECD methodology to preclude exchange rate movements from
aﬀecting the real variables. I also construct a synthetic GDP-weighted series for the U.S. Dollar/Euro
nominal exchange rate and the EURIBOR prior to 2001 based on country-by-country data. More details
can be found in the dataset’s companion description ﬁle.
Data Series. I collect information on real output (rgdp), real consumption (rcons), consumer price indexes
(cpi), nominal exchange rates (ner), employment (emp), short-term nominal interest rates (i), population
size (n), U.S. terms of trade (tot), and money with zero maturity (mzm).
◦ Real output (rgdp). Data at quarterly frequency, transformed to millions of national currency, and
seasonally adjusted. Source: OECD’s Main Economic Indicators,a n dO E C D ’ sQuarterly National Accounts.
◦ Real consumption (rcons). Data at quarterly frequency, transformed to millions of national currency,
and seasonally adjusted. Source: OECD’s Main Economic Indicators,a n dO E C D ’ sQuarterly National
Accounts.
◦ Consumer price indexes (cpi). Data at quarterly frequency, expressed in percentages, and not seasonally
adjusted. Source: OECD’s Main Economic Indicators.
◦ Nominal exchange rate (ner). Data at quarterly frequency, transformed to be quoted as U.S. Dollars
per National Currency (US$/National Currency), and not seasonally adjusted. Sources: Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, IMF’s International Financial Statistics,a n dO E C D ’ sAnnual National
Accounts.
◦ Employment (emp). Data at quarterly frequency, expressed in thousands of employees and self-
employed individuals, and seasonally adjusted. Source: OECD’s Economic Outlook.
◦ (Working-age) Population between 15-64 years old (pop): Data at quarterly frequency, expressed in
thousands of individuals, and seasonally adjusted. Source: OECD’s Economic Outlook.
◦ Money market interest rates at 3-month maturity (i): Data at quarterly frequency, expressed in
percentages, and not seasonally adjusted. Source: Eurostat.
◦ U.S. terms of trade (for all goods and services) = U.S. import deﬂator (for all goods and services) /
U.S. export deﬂator (for all goods and services) (tot): Data at quarterly frequency, expressed in percentages,
and not seasonally adjusted. Source: OECD’s Economic Outlook.
◦ Money with zero maturity (mzm): Data at quarterly frequency, expressed in millions of the national
currency, and seasonally adjusted. Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Bank of
39England, and European Central Bank.
Updating Procedure. The real output (rgdp), real consumption (rcons), employment (emp), and the
money with zero maturity (mzm) are expressed in per capita terms dividing each one of these series by the











and the consumption diﬀerential across countries, CR
t ≡ Ct
C∗
t , from the dataset described before. Similarly, I
proxy the exogenous shocks as follows,
productivity shocks {a,a∗} ≡ per capita rgdp / per capita emp,
preference shocks {ξ,ξ
∗} ≡ μ · [i(−1) − 100 · (ln(cpi) − ln(cpi(−1)))], μ =0 .1,
monetary supply shocks {m,m∗} ≡ mzm.
I express all variables in logs, except the nominal short-term interest rates and the preference shocks. I also
multiply all data by 100, except the nominal short-term interest rates (which come already in percentages)
and the preference shocks. Finally, all series are Hodrick-Prescott (H-P) ﬁltered to eliminate their underlying
trend. I use the H-P smoothing parameter at 1600 for my quarterly dataset.
40Tables
Table 1: The Standard Deviations and First-order Autocorrelations of the Exchange Rates.
Historical Statistics: Standard Deviations
Foreign Country σ (b c) σ (b c∗) σ
¡
b cR¢
σ(b p) σ(b p∗) σ
¡
−b pR¢




U.K. 1.236 1.535 1.568 1.373 1.744 1.544 7.533 7.795 2.709
Euro12 1.236 1.044 1.232 1.373 0.908 1.287 7.683 7.989 2.709
Historical Statistics: First-Order Autocorrelations
Foreign ρ(b c) ρ(b c∗) ρ
¡
b cR¢
ρ(b p) ρ(b p∗) ρ
¡
−b pR¢




U.K. 0.866 0.788 0.748 0.933 0.823 0.774 0.823 0.843 0.817
Euro12 0.866 0.822 0.800 0.933 0.918 0.928 0.848 0.859 0.817
The standard deviations and ﬁrst-order autocorrelations of the exchange rates, the CPI prices, the terms of trade
and the per capita consumption in the U.S., the U.K. and the Euro-zone (12). Quarterly sample: 1973:I-2006:III.
Sources: OECD and FRB/FRBNY.
This table reports the statistics after each series has been expressed in logs, multiplied by 100 and H-P ﬁltered
(smoothing parameter=1600). The superscript "*" denotes the foreign country, while no superscript indicates the
U.S. The superscript "R" denotes a relative variable, computed as the ratio of the U.S. value over the foreign value.
41Table 2: The Cross-correlation of the Exchange Rates.
Historical Statistics: The Correlation Matrix for the US-UK.
b c b c∗ b cR b p b p∗ −b pR b rs b s c tot
b c 10 .376 0.421 −0.770 −0.499 0.121 −0.188 −0.206 −0.447
b c∗ 1 −0.683 −0.193 −0.543 −0.441 0.320 0.397 0.074
b cR 1 −0.419 0.138 0.528 −0.462 −0.551 −0.425
b p 10 .531 −0.289 0.209 0.260 0.595
b p∗ 10 .657 0.103 −0.031 0.192
−b pR 1 −0.070 −0.266 −0.312
b rs 10 .980 0.481
b s 10 .527
c tot 1
The cross-correlation of the exchange rates, the CPI prices, the terms of trade and the per capita
consumption in the U.S. and the U.K. Quarterly sample: 1973:I-2006:III. Sources: OECD and
FRB/FRBNY.
This table reports the statistics after each series has been expressed in logs, multiplied by 100 and
H-P ﬁltered (smoothing parameter=1600). The superscript "*" denotes the U.K., while no superscript
indicates the U.S. The superscript "R" denotes a relative variable, computed as the ratio of the U.S.
value over the U.K. value.
Historical Statistics: The Correlation Matrix for the US-Euro12.
b c b c∗ b cR b p b p∗ −b pR b rs b s c tot
b c 10 .426 0.642 −0.770 −0.560 0.427 −0.007 −0.076 −0.447
b c∗ 1 −0.420 −0.138 −0.681 −0.334 0.266 0.309 0.164
b cR 1 −0.656 0.015 0.711 −0.233 −0.338 −0.587
b p 10 .423 −0.769 −0.176 −0.045 0.595
b p∗ 10 .254 −0.492 −0.514 −0.004
−b pR 1 −0.160 −0.314 −0.637
b rs 10 .987 0.275
b s 10 .367
c tot 1
The cross-correlation of the exchange rates, the CPI prices, the terms of trade and the per capita
consumption in the U.S. and the Euro-zone (12). Quarterly sample: 1973:I-2006:III. Sources: OECD
and FRB/FRBNY.
This table reports the statistics after each series has been expressed in logs, multiplied by 100 and
H-P ﬁltered (smoothing parameter=1600). The superscript "*" denotes the Euro-zone (12), while no
superscript indicates the U.S. The superscript "R" denotes a relative variable, computed as the ratio of
the U.S. value over the Euro-zone value.
42Table 3: The Benchmark Parametrization.
Benchmark Sensitivity Analysis
Parameters on Households’ Preferences:
Discount Factor β =0 .99264 =
Elasticity of Intratemporal Substitution σ =1 .5=
Elasticity of Substitution across Varieties θ =7 .88 =
Coeﬀ. of Relative Risk Aversion on Consumption γ =5 =
Elasticity of Labor Supply ϕ =0 .47 =
Home Population Size n =0 .5=
Rate of Habit Formation b=0 ( 0 ,0.7)
Parameters on Contract Duration for Firms:
Domestic Firms, Domestic Market αH=0 .62 (0.407,0.77)
Foreign Firms, Domestic Market αH∗=0 .62 (0.407,0.77)
Domestic Firms, Foreign Market αF=0 .62 (0.407,0.77)
Foreign Firms, Foreign Market αF∗=0 .62 (0.407,0.77)
Parameters of the Financial Intermediaries:
Cost of Borrowing δ =0 ( 0 ,0.007)
The table deﬁnes benchmark parameterization and the choice of a range of values to perform a sensitivity
analysis on the structural parameters.
The results of the sensitivity analysis for a given parameter are discussed in the paper, but not always
reported. They can be obtained directly from the author upon request.
43Table 4: The VAR(1) Estimate for the Exogenous Shocks.
Unrestricted Vector Autoregression: VAR Estimates.
b a b a∗ b ξ b ξ
∗

































































































































































































The table identiﬁes the unrestricted VAR(1) estimates used to calibrate the structure of the stochastic process for the exogenous
shocks in the model. Quarterly sample (adjusted): 1974:II-2006:III. Included observations: 130 after adjustments. Standard
errors in () and t-statistics in [].
This table reports the estimates after each series (except the preference shocks) has been expressed in logs and multiplied by 100.
All series are H-P ﬁltered (smoothing parameter=1600). The superscript "*" denotes the Euro-zone (12), while no superscript
indicates the U.S.
The results may be sensitive to the data used to represent (or proxy) for the exogenous shocks of the model. I have experimented
with other alternative datasets and speciﬁcations, but chose not to report the ﬁndings here. More details can be obtained directly
from the author upon request.
44Restricted Vector Autoregression: VAR Estimates.
b a b a∗ b ξ b ξ
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The table identiﬁes the restricted VAR(1) estimates for the exogenous shocks in the model. Quarterly sample (adjusted):
1974:II-2006:III. Included observations: 130 after adjustments. Standard errors in () and t-statistics in [].
This table reports the estimates after each series (except the preference shocks) has been expressed in logs and multiplied by 100.
All series are H-P ﬁltered (smoothing parameter=1600). The superscript "*" denotes the Euro-zone (12), while no superscript
indicates the U.S.
The results may be sensitive to the data used to represent (or proxy) for the exogenous shocks of the model. I have experimented
with other alternative datasets and speciﬁcations, but chose not to report the ﬁndings here. More details can be obtained directly
from the author upon request.
45Unrestricted VAR: Residual Covariance Matrix.
b a b a∗ b ξ b ξ
∗
b m b m∗
b a 0.272186 0.048630 −0.002570 −0.005888 0.074790 0.032637
b a∗ 0.385752 −0.002300 −0.004776 −0.057794 0.270317




b m 2.966766 0.090339
b m 0.565956
The table reports the residual covariance matrix for the estimated, unrestricted VAR(1) process.
For convenience, I use the same notation to identify the residual of a shock that I use for the
shock itself. Notice, however, that this table simply represents the covariance of the residuals.
Quarterly sample (adjusted): 1974:II-2006:III. Included observations: 130 after adjustments.
This table reports the statistics after each series (except the preference shocks) has been ex-
pressed in logs and multiplied by 100. All series are H-P ﬁltered (smoothing parameter=1600).
The superscript "*" denotes the Euro-zone (12), while no superscript indicates the U.S.
Unrestricted VAR: Residual Correlation Matrix.
b a b a∗ b ξ b ξ
∗
b m b m∗
b a 10 .150077 −0.065136 −0.170585 0.083228 0.083155
b a∗ 1 −0.048967 −0.116228 −0.054024 0.578533




b m 10 .069717
b m 1
The table reports the residual correlation matrix for the estimated, unrestricted VAR(1)
process. For convenience, I use the same notation to identify the residual of a shock
that I use for the shock itself. Notice, however, that this table simply represents the
correlation of the residuals. Quarterly sample (adjusted): 1974:II-2006:III. Included
observations: 130 after adjustments.
This table reports the statistics after each series (except the preference shocks) has
been expressed in logs and multiplied by 100. All series are H-P ﬁltered (smoothing
parameter=1600). The superscript "*" denotes the Euro-zone (12), while no superscript
indicates the U.S.
46Table 5: The Theoretical Moments of the Model.
Benchmark Public Monetary Policy
Statistics Data SSFM SSF SSM DSFM SSFM SSF SSM DSFM








/σ(b c)1 .041 4.854 5.038 8.301 6.126 5.338 5.530 8.629 6.251
σ (b rs)/σ(b c)6 .216 5.029 5.554 4.946 4.341 3.903 4.335 4.219 3.625














0.928 0.952 0.951 0.947 0.964 0.950 0.949 0.947 0.964
ρ(b rs)0 .848 0.576 0.590 0.695 0.719 0.576 0.597 0.758 0.763















−0.587 −0.314 −0.335 −0.090 0.058 −0.335 −0.371 −0.150 0.039




−0.314 −0.831 −0.831 −0.803 −0.728 −0.925 −0.926 −0.883 −0.815
ρ(b s, b rs)0 .987 0.843 0.863 −0.022 0.255 0.854 0.876 −0.276 0.056
Exchange rates, CPI prices and per capita consumption statistics under the benchmark of asymmetric information or
asymmetric information with common knowledge about monetary policy. This table reports the selected theoretical moments
for each series given my calibration of the structural parameters and the estimation of the stochastic process for the exogenous
variables. I use Matlab 7.4.0 to compute the equilibrium, and DYNARE v3.065 for the stochastic simulation. SSMM
indicates that the parameterization is αH = αH∗ = αF = αF∗ = 0.62. SSF indicates that the parameterization is αH =
αH∗ = 0.5335 and αF = αF∗ = 0.72. SSM indicates that the parameterization is αH = 0.5335, αH∗ = 0.7, αF = 0.5335
and αF∗ = 0.7. DSFM indicates that the parameterization is αH = 0.407, αH∗ = 0.67, αF = 0.66 and αF∗ = 0.77. All
parameterizations introduce G. Benigno’s (2004) pricing wedge between the local and foreign prices of a given good, except
SSFM and SSF. The superscript "*" denotes the Euro-zone (12), while no superscript indicates the U.S. The superscript
"R" denotes a relative variable, computed as the ratio of the U.S. value over the Euro-zone value.
47Public Productivity All Public Information
Statistics Data SSFM SSF SSM DSFM SSFM SSF SSM DSFM








/σ(b c)1 .041 4.778 4.963 8.334 6.149 5.264 5.523 9.026 6.452
σ (b rs)/σ(b c)6 .216 4.896 5.364 4.919 4.270 3.634 4.062 4.356 3.639














0.928 0.950 0.950 0.944 0.961 0.953 0.952 0.949 0.964
ρ(b rs)0 .848 0.595 0.607 0.717 0.745 0.605 0.626 0.793 0.796















−0.587 −0.315 −0.336 −0.085 0.073 −0.359 −0.016 −0.049 0.117




−0.314 −0.836 −0.837 −0.808 −0.735 −0.929 −0.929 −0.890 −0.826
ρ(b s, b rs)0 .987 0.845 0.863 −0.057 0.219 0.843 0.865 −0.328 −0.001
Exchange rates, CPI prices and per capita consumption statistics under the asymmetric information with common knowledge
about productivity or symmetric information with common knowledge of all the shocks. This table reports the selected
theoretical moments for each series given my calibration of the structural parameters and the estimation of the stochastic
process for the exogenous variables. I use Matlab 7.4.0 to compute the equilibrium, and DYNARE v3.065 for the stochastic
simulation. SSMM indicates that the parameterization is αH = αH∗ = αF = αF∗ = 0.62. SSF indicates that the
parameterization is αH = αH∗ = 0.5335 and αF = αF∗ = 0.72. SSM indicates that the parameterization is αH = 0.5335,
αH∗ = 0.7, αF = 0.5335 and αF∗ = 0.7. DSFM indicates that the parameterization is αH = 0.407, αH∗ = 0.67, αF = 0.66
and αF∗ = 0.77. All parameterizations introduce G. Benigno’s (2004) pricing wedge between the local and foreign prices
of a given good, except SSFM and SSF. The superscript "*" denotes the Euro-zone (12), while no superscript indicates the
U.S. The superscript "R" denotes a relative variable, computed as the ratio of the U.S. value over the Euro-zone value.
48Table 6: The Theoretical Moments of the Model with Risk-Averse Financial Intermediaries.
δ =0 δ =0 .001 δ =0 .007
Statistics Data SSFM SSF DSFM SSFM SSF DSFM SSFM SSF DSFM








/σ(b c)1 .041 4.854 5.038 6.126 4.536 4.630 4.484 3.738 3.780 4.290
σ (b rs)/σ (b c)6 .216 5.029 5.554 4.341 4.817 5.194 4.617 4.135 4.345 3.883














0.928 0.952 0.951 0.964 0.950 0.949 0.9511 0.948 0.948 0.953
ρ(b rs)0 .848 0.576 0.590 0.719 0.575 0.588 0.6607 0.572 0.584 0.631















−0.587 −0.314 −0.335 0.058 −0.166 −0.219 −0.274 −0.067 −0.153 −0.264




−0.314 −0.831 −0.831 −0.728 −0.828 −0.828 −0.727 −0.820 −0.824 −0.754
ρ(b s, b rs)0 .987 0.843 0.863 0.255 0.849 0.866 0.745 0.856 0.870 0.689
Exchange rates, CPI prices and per capita consumption statistics under the benchmark of asymmetric information. This table
reports the selected theoretical moments for each series given my calibration of the structural parameters and the estimation
of the stochastic process for the exogenous variables. I use Matlab 7.4.0 to compute the equilibrium, and DYNARE v3.065 for
the stochastic simulation. SSMM indicates that the parameterization is αH = αH∗ = αF = αF∗ = 0.62. SSF indicates that
the parameterization is αH = αH∗ = 0.5335 and αF = αF∗ = 0.72. DSFM indicates that the parameterization is αH = 0.407,
αH∗ = 0.67, αF = 0.66 and αF∗ = 0.77 whenever δ = 0. Alternatively, DSFM indicates that the paremeterization is αH =
0.407, αH∗ = 0.77, αF = 0.66 and αF∗ = 0.67 whenever δ = 0.001 or 0.007 to avoid the indeterminacy/non-existence region.
Only the DSFM parameterization introduces G. Benigno’s (2004) pricing wedge between the local and foreign prices of a given
good. The superscript "*" denotes the Euro-zone (12), while no superscript indicates the U.S. The superscript "R" denotes a
relative variable, computed as the ratio of the U.S. value over the Euro-zone value.
49Table 7: The Theoretical Moments of the Model with Habit Formation.
b =0 b =0 .25 b =0 .7
Statistics Data SSM DSFM SSM DSFM SSM DSFM








/σ (b c)1 .041 8.301 6.126 8.556 6.251 10.306 6.936
σ(b rs)/σ(b c)6 .216 4.946 4.341 5.110 4.450 6.237 5.062














0.928 0.947 0.964 0.947 0.964 0.946 0.963
ρ(b rs)0 .848 0.695 0.719 0.695 0.721 0.690 0.709















−0.587 −0.090 0.058 −0.062 0.075 0.016 0.114




−0.314 −0.803 −0.728 −0.802 −0.726 −0.796 −0.724
ρ(b s, b rs)0 .987 −0.022 0.255 −0.013 0.260 0.043 0.326
Exchange rates, CPI prices and per capita consumption statistics under the benchmark of asymmetric
information. This table reports the selected theoretical moments for each series given my calibration
of the structural parameters and the estimation of the stochastic process for the exogenous variables.
I use Matlab 7.4.0 to compute the equilibrium, and DYNARE v3.065 for the stochastic simulation.
SSM indicates that the parameterization is αH = 0.5335, αH∗ = 0.7, αF = 0.5335, and αF∗ = 0.7.
DSFM indicates that the parameterization is αH = 0.407, αH∗ = 0.67, αF = 0.66 and αF∗ = 0.77.
Both parameterizations introduce G. Benigno’s (2004) pricing wedge between the local and foreign
prices of a given good. The superscript "*" denotes the Euro-zone (12), while no superscript indicates
the U.S. The superscript "R" denotes a relative variable, computed as the ratio of the U.S. value over
the Euro-zone value.
50Table 8: The Theoretical Cross-correlations of the Model.
Statistics: The Correlation Matrix.
The Benchmark under Asymmetrically-Dispersed Information.
b c b c∗ b cR b p b p∗ −b pR b rs b s c tot












































































b s 1 −0.026
(0.367)
c tot 1
T h eB e n c h m a r ku n d e rP u b l i cM o n e t a r yP o l i c y .
b c b c∗ b cR b p b p∗ −b pR b rs b s c tot
















































































Exchange rates, CPI prices and per capita consumption statistics under the benchmark of asymmetric informa-
tion or asymmetric information with common knowledge about monetary policy. This table reports the selected
theoretical moments for each series given my calibration of the structural parameters and the estimation of the
stochastic process for the exogenous variables. I use Matlab 7.4.0 to compute the equilibrium, and DYNARE
v3.065 for the stochastic simulation. I assume symmetric nominal rigidities across countries and ﬁrms, i.e. αH =
αH∗ = αF = αF∗ = 0.62. This parameterization does not introduce G. Benigno’s (2004) pricing wedge between
the local and foreign prices of a given good. The superscript "*" denotes the Euro-zone (12), while no superscript
indicates the U.S. The superscript "R" denotes a relative variable, computed as the ratio of the U.S. value over
the Euro-zone value.
(∗)T h es u p e r s c r i p ti n d i c a t e st h a tt h et h e oretical cross-correlation has the same sign as the corresponding empirical
one. For comparison purposes, the true cross-correlations are also included within parenthesis.

























Asymmetric Info ρ( rs )
Symmetric Info ρ( rs )
45 Degree Line
Asymmetric Info σ( rs )/σ( c )
Symmetric Info σ( rs )/σ( c )
T h ea u t o c o r r e l a t i o no ft h er e a le x c h a n g er a t ea n dt h er a t i oo ft h es t a n d a r dd e v i a t i o no ft h er e a le x c h a n g er a t eo v e rt h e
standard deviation of domestic per capita consumption. This ﬁgure plots the selected statistics over a grid of points that
spans the parameter space (between 0.1 and 0.9). The linear interpolation of the values between two realization is added for
illustrative purposes. However, it does not take into account the fact that for some values of the parameter space a solution
may not exist or may be indeterminate. The horizontal axis represents a particular choice of the degree of price stickiness
under the assumption that αH = αH∗ = αF = αF∗. All values correspond to the theoretical moments implied by the model.
I use Matlab 7.4.0 to compute the equilibrium, and DYNARE v3.065 for the stochastic simulation. No superscript indicates
the U.S.
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